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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The concept of decline has variously been applied to businesses, organizations, groups, 
and government (Levine 1978; Lorange and Nelson 1987; Whetten 1980).  The term 
decline has also been used to describe various government agencies such as NASA.  It is 
the theory put forth presently that decline in its traditional form in the literature does not 
apply to government agencies.  Decline has been previously characterized as a time of 
decreasing or restricted resources, conflict, a decrease in innovativeness, a decrease in 
organizational size, a decrease in income or profits, and an organization’s inability to 
adapt (Cameron, Whetten, and Kim; Weitzel and Jonsson).  These characteristics, 
however, are not applicable to individual government agencies; an agency’s tasks, form, 
and functions are usually set and defined through legislation, its budget is tied to the 
budget of the rest of the US government, and policy is usually generated at the top.  
Because of these pitfalls, I propose a new model of operations at the government level: 
the government agency decline model.  This model posits that an agency’s operations are 
in constant flux depending on the nature of the US economy at any given time and a 
number of other variables.  Pursuant to this, I propose that there is a strong relationship 
between budget, agency performance, and power; more money in an agency’s accounts 
contributes to bettering their performance, better performance leads to more power, 
which can lead to an increased budget.  Therefore this cycle can begin and be interrupted 
at the money stage depending on the state of the American economy.  
 
Findings show that there are relationships between economy, budgets, performance, and 
power leading to an enhanced explanation of NASA’s yearly budget.  Recommendations 
 ii
for further research include examining a wider array of government agencies and 
developing better ways to measure power. 
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 CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 What do you do after you have been to the Moon?  This question has plagued not 
only astronauts but NASA as it has attempted to adjust to life without a Cold War 
rationale for influxes of large amounts of money.  With landing on the Moon often 
considered the high point in a precarious NASA history, accomplishments afterward may 
seemingly be characterized as a decline in the functions of NASA.  The time period 
following the Apollo moon landings has been variously described as NASA’s eclipse or 
decline, but what is decline?1  What does decline mean?  Or rather, how do you top the 
moon? 
 Human beings, organizations, systems, and companies are not expected to run and 
operate at their highest standards at all times.  People get sick, systems run slowly, and 
companies may not run as efficiently as they used to.  Having an agency, organization, 
corporation, or company running at its highest potential for any amount of time is an 
incredible endeavor that takes significant inputs of innovation, funds, and resources.  In 
some instances, changes in these inputs and thus that organization’s performance may be 
considered a decline in whatever sense that the phrase is used.    
Yet, it is here that a difference between public (or government) and private arises- 
if a private organization experiences decline, it is generally said to have fewer resources, 
lower profits, a lack of innovativeness and/or long-term planning, more turnover among 
employees, and a growing rigidity in the organization.2  In public or governmental 
organizations, budgets are generally dependent on overall government budgeting and the 
tasks assigned to organizations and how they go about them are often regulated by an 
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agency’s enabling legislation and a myriad of other rules and statutes.  The problem thus 
encountered is how to reconcile the idea of decline with the inherent characteristics of a 
governmental agency. 
The primary focus of this investigation is an examination of organizational 
decline relevant to politicized government agencies, specifically NASA.   Because of the 
nature of governmental agencies, the idea of organizational decline as it is presented in 
the literature, I hypothesize, is irrelevant to government organizations; therefore I 
propose a model of governmental agency decline (GAD) in which an agency’s operations 
are in constant flux depending on the nature of the US economy at any given time and a 
number of other variables.  Pursuant to this, I propose that there is a strong relationship 
between budget, agency performance, and power; more money in an agency’s accounts 
contributes to bettering their performance, better performance leads to more power, 
which can lead to an increased budget.  Therefore this cycle can begin and be interrupted 
at the money stage depending on the state of the American economy. 
 There is perhaps no better agency to examine in regards to this problem than the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  Its history of publicly 
identifiable programs, pursuits, challenges and failures makes it quite vulnerable to 
declarations of decline.  The first flight of the reusable space shuttle and the successful 
Mars rovers were publicly accessible events that exhibited what makes NASA great; at 
the same time, the disasters Challenger and Columbia were public tragedies that signify 
NASA’s failures.  While the public may not always observe the successes and failures of 
the Departments of Agriculture or Treasury, they can readily see whether NASA 
launches made it into space or shuttles made it home. 
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 This is not to say that the analysis done here would not or could not apply to other 
government agencies; the very nature of NASA that their achievements, their outputs, are 
readily available to be examined, put it in a unique position compared to other agencies to 
be studied.  One could certainly trace the performance of the US Geological Survey and 
identify changes, whether positive or negative, in its performance, but NASA offers us a 
rare chance at examining an agency that is charged with highly technical tasks and must 
protect human life to the best of its ability at the same time.   
NASA at its heart is a government organization that does not exist in a vacuum, 
unlike the environment in which its members at times operate. Budgetary politics, 
election year ploys, and changes in political environments can and do affect NASA and 
the way in which it operates.  The challenges that politics puts on NASA only complicate 
its missions and actions.  It is this interplay between government and NASA that 
explanation is sought for here. 
Who or What is NASA? 
 Variously, in the first pages of this examination, NASA has been referred to as a 
government organization, a public agency, and a group that has readily identifiable 
missions, successes, and failures.  One of the key concepts that must be identified here at 
the outset is what NASA is, how it operates, and perhaps even why it operates as it does.  
To be sure, a large organization is almost always made up of smaller component parts 
and people; it is easy enough to state that the sum of the parts equals the whole but how 
do those component parts influence the whole?   While Downs and Wilson provide 
rudimentary mechanisms to explain this in the form of their theories on bureaucracy, it 
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should be sufficient here to identify NASA as an organization with a particular culture or 
way of doing things.3   
But the culture is only the way NASA goes about doing things, how does it decide 
what it does in the first place?  NASA is the primary arm of the US federal government 
for executing US space policy and as such, ends are often decided for it with the means 
being left to NASA.   Is it the president, the Congress, or some combination of those 
actors that decide what NASA will do?  This topic will be addressed in chapter two, but it 
is important to note, as Krasner does, that whether the agency has the ability to decide for 
itself what to do is still a function of presidential policy.4  Even when the president is not 
setting specific policy, “some policy options are never presented;” in this sense, how does 
NASA decide what options to present and what options to argue for?5
NASA decision-making is very much a result of its culture in that the missions 
they strive to achieve and push for are missions that have been in their blood from the 
beginning- human spaceflight.  No matter the resources at their disposal, “the agency 
agenda has been consistent (albeit tactically flexible) while the external agenda often 
changes rapidly in different directions.”6  Therefore, the major policy decisions, while 
being generally acceptable at the presidential level, are usually formed and argued for 
strongly by NASA leaders as a result of their history and culture. 
Plan of Study 
 It is the hypothesis here that the idea of decline as presented in the literature and 
all too often used by others to characterize NASA is irrelevant; characteristics such as 
increasing bureaucracy and competition, and decreasing innovativeness and 
profits/income are characteristics that do not apply only to government agencies but 
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rather government as a whole.  In order to examine this idea, this study will proceed in 
three phases: a critical review of decline as presented in the literature, an examination of 
the history of NASA between 1970 and 2005, and an explanation of the governmental 
agency decline model, and a test of that model using NASA as a case study.   
Governmental Agency Decline 
 It would be very easy to declare that NASA has declined and perhaps, in certain 
cases, one could say that is has declined.  There are two questions that need to be 
answered, however.  One, what is decline?  Decline has been conceptualized in a variety 
of ways as shown in table 1.1.  Not all of these can equally be applied to government 
organizations as will be examined shortly.  The question left to be answered, then, is what 
characteristics explain or demonstrate governmental agency decline. 
Table 0-1:  Characteristics of Organizational Decline 
Characteristics Sources 
Increasing conflict internally Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Increasing rigidity Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Decreasing morale Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Lack of innovation Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Elimination of slack resources Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Concern with survival Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Inability to adapt Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing sales Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing profits Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Increasing competition Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing capacity for innovation McCurdy 1991 
Decreasing flexibility McCurdy 1991 
Decreasing number or excess of personnel Whetten 1980; Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Decreasing demand for services Whetten 1980 
Lack of clear goals Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Loss of effective communication Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Outdated structure Lorange and Nelson 1987 
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 Many researchers are already familiar with the work of Downs with his theory of 
organizational life cycles and Wilson’s writings on bureaucracy.  In general, both of these 
theories identify cycles through which government agencies and organizations go through 
with Downs focusing primarily on the beginnings of an agency.  As will be discussed in 
chapter two, neither Downs nor Wilson’s descriptions of bureaucracy hold up under 
examination.  What I believe will be found in the course of an examination of the decline 
literature, is that the idea of decline as traditionally presented by authors such as 
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim and Weitzel and Jonsson are not applicable to government 
agencies which leads to the second question that needs to be addressed:  if the traditional 
idea of organizational decline is not applicable, what is?  The model thus put forth, 
governmental agency decline (or GAD), is designed to address the inability of the decline 
literature to apply to government.  In dismissing the idea of a total decline, this model 
posits that government operations or an agency’s operations are continually in flux 
dependent partially on the state of the national economy.  A visual representation of this 
model appears in figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 0-1:  A Model of Governmental Agency Decline 
 6
In this model, which assumes that actors act rationally, an increase in an agency’s 
budget allows it to funnel more money into operations, safety, and new programs 
increasing the agency’s overall performance.  As an agency’s performance increases and 
it is seen by others in government as doing a better job, the agency’s power and influence 
with others in the government thus increases (for our purposes here, power is defined as 
the ability of person or subject A to get what they want from person or subject B; this is 
discussed more fully in chapter four).  This power and influence often translates into 
more money in the next budgetary cycle and so goes the model.  It is very important, 
however, to note that this cycle is started at and can be interrupted at the budgetary or 
money position.  If the Congress simply does not have the money to give to agencies for 
whatever variety of reasons, no amount of agency lobbying will be able to overcome that.   
Conversely, though, what happens if the national economy improves but the 
agency does not have sufficient amounts of power to acquire what it would like from 
Congress?  Certain scenarios can be imagined where, either the leadership of an agency 
or an agency’s actions have received serious rebukes from the Congress; for instance, the 
current Congress was involved in a debate concerning the now former Attorney General, 
Alberto Gonzalez and his leadership of the Department of Justice.  But, for agencies in or 
out of favor with the Congress, minor controversies or successes do not necessarily equal 
increases or decreases in budgets.   Wildavsky puts forth the idea of “fair share” in his 
work on the congressional budgeting process explaining that, through the years, an idea 
of how much money an agency is budgeted is solidified in the minds of representatives.7  
While Wildavsky dos not address the idea of governmental decline, his explanation of 
fair share within the budgeting process helps to explain why agency budgets remain fairly 
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stable whether representatives and senators are fans of particular agencies and 
departments or not. 
NASA’s History 
 While the histories of the Space Age and NASA have been written ad nauseum, it 
is the aim of this paper to look at the years following the moon landing with a specific 
focus on the interplay between NASA and the rest of the government.  I find that this 
exposition is needed for two interrelated reasons which will be discussed in turn:  one, 
those scholars who have criticized NASA’s performance and track record have focused 
only on specific instances and not the entirety of NASA’s history; two, there only seems 
to be concern among academics with NASA’s intragovernmental relations when major 
programs are up for debate.  
 If the Challenger accident had not occurred in 1986, would the space shuttle 
decision and design process been put under the microscope so soon?  Would there have 
been any need in examining NASA’s culture and its role in the accident?  While 
hypothetical questions are hardly, if ever, answered, examining this problem from that 
standpoint is helpful.  All too often, people are not spurred to action unless a major 
accident or disaster occurs; this “Pearl Harbor” effect has occurred all too often in recent 
history- September 11th, the federal response, or lack thereof, to natural disasters, 
Challenger and Columbia.  In the wake of both shuttle accidents, authors have come out 
of the woodworks explaining how NASA has done wrong and should be abolished.  
Garwin writes, “The Challenger disaster has revealed in the primary NASA program bad 
design, bad management, and inadequate oversight.”8  Murray, again in the wake of 
Challenger, criticized the lack of debate concerning NASA’s programs9 and more 
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recently Klerkx contends that Columbia’s accident has allowed NASA to keep human 
spaceflight out of the private sectors’ hands.10  The point is, however, that none of these 
authors have noted the achievements that NASA has made, instead criticizing NASA for 
only one event. 
 I am not saying that these criticisms are unfair; indeed, serious errors and 
miscalculations were made not only in the shuttle disasters but also in lost science 
missions such as the Mars Polar Lander and the Mars Climate Orbiter.  This increased 
criticism also leads to the second hole in the NASA literature- when concentration on 
NASA has increased, then more analyses on NASA’s interactions with the rest of the 
government are also examined.  Just like the authors who have funneled criticism at 
NASA in the wake of disaster, in order to examine the ups and downs of NASA between 
1970 and 2005, we must also fill in the holes between accidents and increased attention.  
Government interactions do not only happen right before or immediately after a critical 
period of time; they occur all the time.   
 Disasters should not be the only impetus for increased examination of anything, 
be it FEMA, NASA, or homeland security.  What is needed in the analysis of decline is a 
baseline from against which to compare NASA’s successes and failures over time.  
Seeing the gaps in the literature between the major milestones of NASA such as the 
shuttle and ISS decisions and Challenger and Columbia, a major part of this study will 
look at completing an analysis of NASA between crises and major decisions. 
Conclusion 
 There is much ground to be covered in this study, but I believe these are questions 
worth taking the time to answer.  In examining what decline means to government and 
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the agencies that make it up, we can endeavor to understand how agencies operate and 
how government operates.  Further insights into the nature of government operations help 
to shed light on what goes on behind the scenes.  Further, if a more accurate description 
of decline as applied to government agencies can be achieved, perhaps new insights into 
NASA can also be found.  Additionally, While Downs and Wilson focus specifically on 
agencies, neither incorporates larger influences into their models of agency operations.  
The work presented here aims to expand the work to include larger factors including 
power, economic conditions, and budgets.   
 It would be a monumental task for anyone to decide what to do once your life’s 
dream has been achieved.  NASA was born out of a Cold War desire to beat the Soviet 
Union in the Space Race and eventually to the moon.  Its goal thus achieved, what do you 
do?  Anything that is not the moon could certainly be seen as a letdown for NASA; 
continually going into low-Earth orbit is certainly not as exciting as venturing out beyond 
the atmosphere into deep space.  Andrew Smith tells an intriguing story in his book 
Moondust of what happened to those twelve astronauts, those twelve men, who between 
the years of 1969 and 1972 ventured to the moon.  He writes of the various twists and 
turns that many of these men took in their lives once they had to adjust to life after the 
moon.  But what happened to NASA?  What happened to the agency once it fulfilled its 
task?  NASA has not gone away, yet has continued to fly despite setbacks in the form of 
Challenger and Columbia.  My mission here is to find out what happened to NASA and 
hopefully to explain why. 
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CHAPTER 2:  BUREAUCRACY, BUDGETING AND DECLINE IN 
GOVERNMENT 
 
When considering how NASA operates or has operated, the last thing we can imagine 
is that it operates in a vacuum.  There exist a number of different and varying political 
pressures, organizational issues, and financial matters.  For NASA, organizing and 
putting into motion technical missions of the highest degree of difficulty could be 
considered hard enough; but to put humans safely into space within specific budget and 
political constraints is even more difficult.   
Scholars have put forth various theories and explanations of bureaucracy, budgeting, 
and decline within government, some of which will be explored here.  In order to explore 
how and why NASA has operated as it has between 1970 and 2005 the analysis requires a 
serious look at existing theories on these subjects.  In this chapter, I will explore the 
existing literature on bureaucracy, budgeting, and organizational decline in turn. 
Bureaucracy 
 The first question that needs to be answered concerning this topic is what exactly 
bureaucracy is.  At times, it seems like a buzzword to be bandied about, criticizing the 
government in some way, shape, or form.  But in reality, the bureaucracy encompasses 
integral parts of the government, if not the government in its entirety.  In fact, Merriam-
Webster defines “bureaucracy” as all of the characteristics previously discussed; 
bureaucracy can be “a body of nonelective government officials,” “government 
characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of 
authority,” or “a system of administration marked by officialism, red tape, and 
proliferation.”1  Bureaucracy can be both beneficial and negative all at the same time 
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then.  It provides a system of objective and reliable organization that allows the 
government to continue to operate but this same reliance on stable organizational patterns 
may not respond well and/or quickly to new issues or situations.   
 The explosive growth that the US government experienced during the New Deal 
period is reflected in the growing amount of literature throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
that deals exclusively with bureaucracy and organizational politics.  Anthony Downs’s 
1967 book Inside Bureaucracy is perhaps one of the best examples of this new niche in 
scholarly studies.  While Downs intends “to develop a useful theory of bureaucratic 
decisionmaking,” he explicates a theory of life cycles of bureaus which is of interest 
here.2  I will briefly outline his life cycle theory and examine its application and limits to 
agencies such as NASA. 
Downs’s Life Cycle of Bureaus 
 Downs begins by postulating four different types of ways that bureaus come into 
being:  (1)  coming from Max Weber, “the routinization of charisma;” (2) a bureau that is 
created purposefully for a specific reason out of various groups; (3) “a new bureau can 
split off from an existing bureau”; and (4) a bureau may come into being through what 
Downs calls “’entrepreneurship’ if a group of men promoting a particular policy gains 
enough support to establish and operate a large nonmarket organization devoted to that 
policy.”3  In all of these cases, however, people are enthusiastic about it and its creation, 
people who are “zealots” and “advocates”, essentially dominate the new bureaus.4   
 In turn, these zealots and advocates push for distinct functions for their bureau to 
carry out and the autonomy to do so as they see fit.  It is like walking a tightrope, 
however, for these new functionaries, as they strive for independence, they also must 
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cultivate support for their activities in people who would continue to support their 
operations.  In the case of government operations, new bureaus must continually struggle 
for the support of those in Congress who would continue to support their operations in 
the form of funding.  It is interesting though, that this would play a part in Downs’s life 
cycle theory.  Because the creation of new government agencies can be quite contentious 
at times, establishing a new agency or department often requires an enormous amount of 
start-up funding and requirements, new organizational patterns, and exercise of political 
power.  One would assume, then, that this new agency, simply by being established 
would overcome this initial struggle for external support. 
 A quite recent example of this phenomenon can be found in the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security following the September 11th terrorist attacks.  
Various proponents argued for consolidating various agencies and new ones underneath a 
brand new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stating that a new department would 
centralize homeland security operations rather than having them scattershot throughout 
the government.  Thus, the DHS would be able to secure a greater amount of control 
through its creation and would have more authority to carry out operations that would 
attempt to safeguard the homeland.  Yet, still others argued that creation of the DHS 
would create more bureaucratic barriers and needlessly expand government.   
 Downs does attempt to address this pitfall yet ultimately dismisses it saying that 
“initial external sources of support are usually weak, scattered, and not accustomed to 
relations with the bureau” so the bureau still must seek out sources of support, a 
constituency.5 Once these sources of supports have been found, the bureau or agency 
generally undergoes a rapid growth to meet what Downs calls its “initial survival 
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threshold.”6  This threshold represents a point at which the bureau has become 
sufficiently useful and old enough to establish regular relations with its clientele.7   
 This rapid growth is certainly not the only state in which bureaus operate; Downs 
theorizes that both “The major causes of both growth and decline in bureaus are rooted in 
exogenous factors in their environment.  As society develops over time, certain social 
functions grow in prominence and others decline.”8  These outside environmental factors 
are not the only determinants of how an agency behaves though, according to Downs; the 
make up, or type, of employees that operate within the agency also affects what the 
agency does and how they do it.  In other words, “if most of the officials occupying key 
positions in a bureau are of one type (that is, conservers, climbers, and so on), then the 
bureau and its behavior will be dominated by the traits typical of that type.”9  This idea 
thus assumes two things:  one, that agency behavior reflects the behavior of a core group 
of individuals, and two, that the type of people that occupy those core positions are 
affected by the state of the agency.   
 Downs continues on to describe only one of these implicit ideas, that the type of 
people that make up the core of an agency is affected by the state of the agency itself.  
Rapid organizational growth, he theorizes, leads to an increase in opportunities and 
promotions particularly for those “climbers” who are interested in such opportunities.10  
Climbers are more inclined to pursue innovation and thus in rapidly growing new 
agencies, more innovation-focused climbers occupy the higher ranks.11  Soon though, 
“growth acceleration… runs into serious obstacles.”12  Downs provides some examples 
of what could cause the growth to slow down and eventually stop:  the social function of 
the agency decreases in relative importance compared to the importance it engendered at 
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its creation, other bureaus become increasingly competitive, the agency finds difficulty in 
continuing to produce good results, and conflicts among the climbers who increasingly 
populate the agency over internal politics redirects their attention from the activities of 
the agency.13  In any case, the agency begins to experience declining growth and in turn 
this lower growth rate influences different operations in the bureau. 
 As the agency begins to slow down its growth, Downs writes that the climbers 
who once occupied the top positions will recognize this and transfer, or jump, to other 
bureaus.14  In turn, “those who have reached high positions in the bureau will lose hope 
of climbing much higher, and will tend to become conservers instead of climbers” and 
the agency will become more conservative in character.15  But again, this assumption 
hinges on taking for granted that the type pf people occupying key positions depends on 
external factors that influence the growth rate of an agency and that the agency is truly 
reflective of the behavior of certain individuals, neither of which Downs fully explores.   
 That an agency’s culture, its way of doing things, is inherently affected by a 
certain group of peoples is something that a wide variety of scholars rebut.  Kay writes 
that, in reference to NASA, “the agency’s long range goals, priorities, timetables, and 
even to some degree its method of operation (as with any major public organization) are 
shaped by a number of complex factors, including the bureaucratic, budgetary, 
legislative, electoral, and other political processes of the US federal government, as well 
as the demands of a wide variety of outside interest groups.”16  McCurdy, whose article 
relating Downs’s life cycle theory and NASA we will address shortly, argues that it was 
experience that taught NASA to become more conservative, particularly its experience 
with failures.17
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 Aside from scholars who have studied NASA in particular, other authors who 
focus on organizational studies often advocate a varying point of view.  Lorange and 
Nelson argue that “With economic success,” rather than decreasing growth rates, “a 
change in emphasis from innovation to tightened administration tends to create an 
increasingly rigid culture.”18  Wilson has a problem with viewing an organization as 
having a certain culture to begin with since this presumption assumes that “an 
organization will have a culture; many, perhaps most, will have several cultures.”19  
Without explaining exactly how or why a small number of individuals control how the 
agency operates, Downs’s argument simply may not hold up.   
 Downs goes on to identify possible ways in which the age of a bureau may affect 
its performance.  Bureaus may perform their tasks better with more experience, they 
“develop more formalized rule systems covering more and more of the possible situations 
they are likely to encounter,” bureaus may focus more on survival rather than fulfilling 
their “social functions,” and the number of administrators rises.20  While the first two of 
these characterizations have been acknowledged and examined by scholars such as 
McCurdy and Wilson, the second characteristic, a focus on survival, seems 
counterintuitive.  Once an agency has reached its survival threshold, as described by 
Downs, the support and base of constituents is fairly guaranteed.  The question then 
becomes, why would the agency shift focus to survival rather than its stated goals and 
missions?  Downs gives us a clue in drawing in the influence of the growing number of 
administrators in the agency- while never saying so, the assumption is that these 
administrators are conservers in nature which would lead the agency to act conservatively 
to ensure its survival.21  But again, we are led back to the original assumption that an 
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agency’s behavior reflects the behavior of a select group of people.  One other question is 
pulled from this discussion, however, and that is why should an agency, who is already 
fairly ensured of its survival, worry about it? 
 Downs’s argument is summed up quite easily:  a new agency is created, it 
experiences rapid growth until it reaches a certain age, maturity, and survival threshold, 
growth begins to slow down and the types of people that comprise the agency changes.  
In actually applying this theory, however, the questions are more numerous.  McCurdy 
attempts to test the life cycle theory against NASA and finds that “the development of the 
US civilian space program followed the pattern predicted by the life-cycle theory” in that 
it had rapidly expanded and then declined.22  McCurdy bases this claim on employment 
statistics citing an aging NASA workforce and a lower turnover rate.23  The assumption 
is that the make up of employees becomes more stable over time, climbers (in Downs’s 
terminology) depart, and the workforce becomes more conservative.  But again, does the 
make up of a core group of employees affect the overall behavior of the agency?   
 Another question that McCurdy seeks to answer is whether there has been an 
increase in bureaucracy in NASA.  Using survey data from NASA employees, McCurdy 
finds that among those who worked for NASA during the Apollo program into the 1980s, 
95% either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “The amount of paperwork has 
increased substantially since I came to work for NASA.”24  But is increased paperwork 
and bureaucracy such a bad thing?  There is wide agreement that as an agency ages, its 
procedures become more stable and formalized, which would perhaps increase 
paperwork and bureaucracy, but there is little agreement as to whether this is an all-
around bad thing.  Having a paper trail and predictable operations could be considered 
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positives in the government sphere.  Knowing how a procedure goes and knowing that 
that procedure will be the same each and every time it is used could also be argued to be 
beneficial.   
 The third question that McCurdy looked to tackle is the question of conservatism.  
McCurdy writes that “In the 1988 survey, agency professionals agreed that ‘at the 
management level, NASA is dominated by people who are cautious and inclined to avoid 
risks.’”25  This gives us a hint that Downs does not provide as to the mechanism through 
which the personality of a small group of people affects the behavior of the agency as a 
whole; conservative leaders and project managers who are less inclined to take on risks, 
may not pursue new and engaging projects that are technically risky.  Instead, they may 
wish to design proven systems and programs that are all but guaranteed to succeed.  This 
may look good as an agency success, but it does not propel space exploration forward.  
As a result, these decisions could be termed conservative.   
 But what causes this conservatism?  Downs proposes that it is the age of an 
agency and search for survival that encourages agency leaders to become more 
conservative.  Klerkx echoes this in describing the decision to pursue the space shuttle as 
a decision that changed NASA from “an organization that would risk its future for an 
outrageous goal – bold and daring, worthy of sacrifice- to one that wanted more than 
anything else to simply survive.”26  But McCurdy in his later book on NASA, writes that, 
“Decreased tolerance for failure discouraged testing…. As political support for the space 
program diminished and the cost of test hardware increased, failure even on a test flight 
unleashed a barrage of criticism.”27  Thus the question becomes, do pressures to become 
more conservative come from within or without an agency?  Do pressures to be 
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successful influence the agency and thus the core group of people?  Or does the pressure 
to be successful and thus more conservative come from the people themselves?  The data 
reported by McCurdy on the 1988 survey of NASA employees provides a few clues.  
McCurdy reports that NASA employees continued to “profess faith in the underlying 
norms of their original test and exploration culture” and “more agreed than did not that 
‘NASA employees are allowed to fail and learn from their mistakes.’”28
 We are left with mixed conclusions, then, about this idea of a life-cycle of 
bureaus.  The rapid expansion of bureaus is to be expected following their creation and at 
some point that growth has to stop.  I have purposefully avoided characterizing this 
slower growth as decline because the questions concerning “decline” are just as many 
and the answers just as few.  Increased bureaucracy is not necessarily a bad thing, and the 
mechanism through which a small number of people influence overall agency behavior is 
questionable.  Nonetheless, Downs gives us a good starting point to continue the 
discussion of agency behavior. 
Wilson and Bureaucracy 
 In a later examination of bureaucracy, James Wilson focuses on how 
bureaucracies operate and why they operate in the fashion that they do.  Expanding on 
Downs’s idea that agencies attempt to acquire sufficient autonomy to perform their tasks, 
Wilson describes what he calls the critical task.  To begin with, the agency must decide 
upon what their critical task is, then there must be agreement within the agency as to 
what that task is.  This sense of mission then leads the agency to acquire enough 
autonomy to perform the task in the way they see fit.29  Wilson also takes the position 
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that people’s actions and beliefs influence the overall behavior of the agency but expands 
it somewhat.   
 For Wilson, it is the whole of the lower and upper-level employees that agree 
upon the critical task at hand.  As for the methods by which those tasks get accomplished, 
it is again an unspoken agreement among all involved.  Wilson writes: 
When a government agency is created, it is not assembled out of people who are 
blanks slates on which the organization can write at will.  Except for young 
employees getting their first jobs, the operators will have worked for other 
organizations, often other government agencies.  Indeed, most new agencies are 
formed out of bits and pieces of old ones….  These people had learned certain 
ways of doing things.  If a new agency has ambiguous goals, the employees’ prior 
experiences will influence how its tasks get defined.30
 
In this way, a great number of employees influence how the agency operates rather than 
the personality of a select few.  This egalitarian outlook has advantages over the Downs 
argument; it provides for the influence of a great many number of people, particularly at 
the lower level, rather than just a select few at the top, it recognizes that there are often a 
number of ways to go about doing things and that it is only through time and effort that 
an agreement results about the proper operation for that agency.  Indeed, Wilson 
explicates this idea arguing that over time, certain definitions of the critical task grew in 
popularity and others waned.31
 Wilson is very cautious concerning the topic of culture.  As noted before, he 
chides the assumption of a single culture within an agency instead choosing to recognize 
that there could be a number of cultures within an agency.  But, when a single culture 
does permeate throughout the agency, Wilson argues that the organization thus has a 
sense of mission.32  Again, though, could it be possible for a number of different cultures 
have the same sense of missions?  Taking NASA as an example, when it was created out 
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of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), it was comprised of 
groups of employees from NACA and elsewhere.  Each of these employees and groups of 
employees came with preconceived notions and a certain culture, a way of doing things.
 Aside from this issue, however, Wilson goes on to discuss how this single culture 
and the mission get developed.  With varying ideas and missions, it is often difficult to 
specify to the operators, the lower-level employees who actually carry out the task, what 
exactly they need to do and how to do it.  Further, the small group of people at the top 
may have limited influence about how the task is accomplished as they are confined by 
“a variety of political and legal constraints.”33  But still, “sometimes an organization is 
endowed with a sense of mission despite ambiguous goals, personal predispositions, 
group pressures, and situational imperatives.  This usually occurs during the formative 
experience of the organization, and experience shaped and interpreted by a founder who 
imposes his or her will on the first generation of operators in a way that profoundly 
affects succeeding generations.”34   
 This sense of mission that, beyond all doubts eventually is adopted plays an 
important part in the shaping of an agency.  If a task does not play an integral part in the 
mission, it may not be pursued to the same degree of voracity as other tasks and goals.35  
Further, tasks that do not approximate with the culture have less of a chance of being 
pursued because those tasks do not seem appropriate to the agency.  For example, NASA 
was created primarily to win the space race against the Soviets and to eventually send 
humans into space.  One mission that has been pushed on the agency in recent decades is 
the study of planet Earth; this task, however, is not something that is natural to the 
 22
majority of the agency.  As such, the agency has resisted such exploration.  The short-
lived Mission to Planet Earth in the 1990s produced few missions.   
 How does one control the mission and the tasks?  Is there any way that the 
mission and the culture can be changed?  As will be examined in Chapter 3, the NASA 
culture has indeed changed over time, from one of a technical and engineering based 
culture, to one that focuses on results and success.  What did this change result from?  
For NASA, it could be the focus on survival following Apollo.  Forced to pursue a space 
shuttle for reasons of economy, NASA was pressured to achieve results and as such, the 
culture changed.  In this example, then, the culture and mission changed as a result of 
changing pressures on the agency that could arguably have also come from within.  
Those within NASA perceived that their survival was at stake and thus relied on certain 
pronouncements of the space shuttle that they could not follow through on.  This 
argument, though, could also be reversed.  Because of the changing context outside of 
NASA, specifically the lessening focus on the space race and space operations, NASA 
had to change its method of operating.  Instead of advocating large-scale, expensive 
human spaceflight missions, NASA adapted and pursued a program that it described as 
cost-effective and efficient.  Most likely, the resulting space shuttle program was a 
combination of these two arguments, but perhaps we will never know for sure. 
 Similar to Downs’s argument concerning increased conservatism in the agency, 
Wilson counters by saying that the resistance to innovation is not surprising.  The 
creation of an agency is designed “in large part to replace the uncertain expectations and 
haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the stability and routine of organized 
relationships.”36  Thus, increasing conservatism and bureaucracy may not be such a bad 
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thing.  Also, bureaucracy and conservatism could be seen as characteristic of government 
as a whole.  Indeed, McCurdy notes that it is difficult to isolate the amount of 
bureaucracy as a result of aging and the amount of bureaucracy that could be attributed to 
the government as a whole.37  Clearly, we cannot treat the agency as existing in a 
vacuum; we still must consider the rest of the government and its influence upon 
agencies. 
Budgeting and Policy Making 
 Most executive agencies do not create their own policies nor do they generate and 
approve their own budgets; the executive and legislative branches play important roles in 
the life of any government agency and particularly NASA.  In the previous chapter, a 
concerted attempt was made to examine the intergovernmental relations of NASA, 
specifically pertaining to the interaction between NASA, the Congress, and the president.  
Here, we will look at the literature concerning these interactions and the various theories 
concerning how and why things get done the way they are.   
How Policy Gets Made 
 Anyone with a basic knowledge of how government works knows that generally, 
the president will set, or at least attempt to set, policy for the executive agencies.  While 
what a policy may cost is kept in mind when designing and setting it, in the case of the 
US government, the trend has been for the policy to be set and then money budgeted by 
the Congress for it.  Thus, we will first consider the genesis of policy and different 
methods for implementing it. 
 One of the greatest intersections between this policy-making topic and NASA is 
Paul Schulman’s analysis of nonincremental policy making. Beginning with two different 
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versions of policy-making, Schulman examines incremental policy-making and the 
divisibility paradigm of policy-making, arguing that “these paradigms have deprived 
policy analysis and public administration of attention to a class of policy enterprises 
which fit into neither framework,” nonincremental policy-making.38    According to 
Schulman, there is a class of policies that cannot be made in small steps (incrementally) 
and must be made comprehensively (not divisibly).39  Using, NASA, more specifically 
manned space exploration, as his main example, Schulman explores this class of 
nonincremental policies. 
 Throughout his study, Schulman identifies a number of characteristics that he 
believes are typical of nonincremental policies.  The first of these is that “critical mass” 
points are inherent and required for the development of nonincremental policies.40  
Similar to Downs’s critical survival threshold in that it requires a certain amount of 
support to ensure its continuance, these critical mass points represent the point at which 
political and resource commitments are available to support a given policy.41  Schulman 
argues that the amount of public pressure that arose following the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik in 1957 and the political pressure to catch up to the Soviets amounted to this 
critical point.  Indeed, as has been seen with major public policy innovations from the 
New Deal to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the creation of new 
agencies to affect new policy has come only after enough support has been acquired to 
create that agency.  
 Again, similar to the Downs argument, Schulman believes that once a 
nonincremental policy has been implemented, it expands greatly in order to overcome the 
“inertia, external resistance, or internal start-up problems.”42  There are two comments in 
 25
order here.  From Schulman’s own argument, he previously stated that it takes a great 
amount of public pressure and political support for a nonincremental policy to be 
successful; if that is the case, then the policy should not have to grow so much as to 
overcome initial resistance.  If there was any amount of resistance, it might not have 
come into being in the first place.  Two, this mirrors quite closely Downs’s life cycle 
theory and its advancement of rapid growth for a young agency.  Up to this point, in fact, 
there are very few differences between Schulman and Downs with the major one being 
that Schulman writes about the policy and Downs writes about the agency.  Yet in the 
case of NASA, the agency was created to advocate the policy, which at the time was 
beating the Soviet Union in the space race. 
 Another Schulman argument that deserves to be discussed here is that of 
consolidation.  Arguing that “The nonincremental policy requires an extensive 
consolidation because of the close interdependency of its component parts,” Schulman 
posits that consolidation of various functionaries is important for the policy to be 
successful.43  Schulman finds evidence of this in NASA in that the research and 
development projects of, for example, rocket boosters, computers, the manned vehicle, 
etc., all had to work together and be consolidated under one umbrella.  Any organization 
will have subsidiaries that deal with their own details and programs, so this may not 
necessarily be characteristic of nonincremental policies.  In addition, NASA was 
essentially created to take space operations away from the military and thus consolidate 
all operations under one civilian agency.44  
Schulman further discusses the subject of decline in nonincremental policies, but 
we will save this discussion for later in this chapter.  But what should be apparent from 
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this discussion of Schulman’s argument is that the only real difference between it and 
earlier arguments, particularly Downs’s, is that Schulman reserves his argument for 
policy while others focus on the agency.  Yet for all the agencies and departments 
created, they are designed to fulfill specific policy needs, thus the question becomes, how 
do you separate the policy from the agency and the agency from the policy?  Clearly, 
when Schulman talks about rapid expansion and consolidation, the policy itself does not 
do this, but the agency.  Then these characteristics must be examples of nonincremental 
agency creation, which could arguably be every agency creation.  Creating the 
Department of Homeland Security or the Tennessee Valley Authority are major actions, 
certainly nonincremental.  If this is the case, then Schulman is simply stating the obvious. 
 In another interesting article published prior to the Schulman study, Krasner asks 
the question of whether bureaucracies are important in the foreign policy-making arena.  
While he focuses on the foreign policy apparatus, the conclusions he draws can still be 
applied here.  Attempting to take the focus away from the bureaucracies and place it back 
in the hands of a single person who can control policy (the president), Krasner argues 
that: 
The President chooses most of the important players and sets the rules.  He selects 
the men who head the large bureaucracies.  These individuals must share his 
values…. The values which bureau chiefs assign to policy outcomes are not 
independent.  They are related through a perspective shared with the President.45
 
Continuing along this line of reasoning, Krasner admits that the president is never 
confronted with all the options or all the information as a result of some bureaucratic 
posturing.46  Those in the bureaucracy who are in charge of briefing the president and 
presenting options may choose to present the information in such a way that the president 
favors the bureaucratic preference.  But, Krasner argues, if this is the case, then the 
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president is not paying very much attention to the agency and its current situation.  
“Presidential attention” on an agency “is a function of presidential values.  The Chief 
Executive involved himself in those areas which he determines to be important.”47  
Therefore, whether the bureaucracy is allowed to pursue policies of its own choosing or 
have policies enforced upon them are still a function of the values and beliefs of one 
person and not the many in the bureaucracy.  Krasner’s analysis thus makes policy-
making a top-down affair; the president will either impose a policy or allow one to be 
imposed on him.  Either way, it is a conscious decision in the executive branch of which 
policy is made and pursued.   
There is evidence of both of these cases in the history of NASA.  Beginning in the 
1960s with Kennedy’s moon landing goal, policy was enforced from the top-down.  
There have been many arguments and analyses putting forth the position that having their 
mission given to them from the president has set NASA up for many a failure.48  Yet 
since the 1970s, NASA has made policy from the bottom-up; in pushing the bureaucratic 
desires, the president, the executive, has simply gone along because NASA and space 
exploration have simply not been one of the major priorities.   
Yet, as a counterpoint to the Krasner argument, the Space Exploration Initiative 
(SEI) proposed by President George H.W. Bush in 1989 is an example of top-down 
policy-making that failed.  Kay has remarked that “SEI appeared to present the agency 
with a larger purpose, a mission, that moved it out of the supporting roles it had been 
playing.”49  The initial assumption, then, is that this sort of policy would be favorable to 
the NASA bureaucracy.  The non-existent nature of the program, however, would give us 
clues that favorable it was not.  Following the announcement of SEI, NASA pursued a 
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90-day report examining the prospects and costs of SEI and eventually gave the program 
a price tag of billions of dollars.50  A program with such a high price tag (given by 
NASA itself) was “dead on arrival” in Congress and gave some the belief that NASA 
intentionally killed the program to instead focus on the space shuttles and the space 
station.51   
Nearly fifteen years following the announcement of SEI, President George W. 
Bush introduced the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE).  And unlike the experience that 
his father had in 1989, the VSE seems to be moving along through development and into 
existence.  After almost 35 years of either bottom-up or failed top-down policy-making, a 
policy that has been announced by the president for the space agency has chances of 
succeeding.  But why now?  The argument that NASA was weakened as an agency 
following Columbia may have some truth to it but in 1989, NASA was still picking up 
the pieces from Challenger.  Some would argue that the spending on the war on terror 
during George W. Bush’s tenure might have dimmed the prospects for a new space 
policy, yet that has not happened yet.  George H.W. Bush did not have an active war that 
needed billions in funding and his policy was dismissed.   
Perhaps the only clue that we might have to the acceptance of the VSE and not the 
SEI is the decade separating them.  As discussed in chapter 2, the mid-1990s marked a 
turn around in public feeling for NASA and space exploration.  With the outpouring of 
grief and the sad reaffirmation of the space program’s existence, the timing was simply 
right for a new space policy.52  Downs and/or Schulman may variously term this a critical 
point that would lead to a reinvigoration of the agency and a new agenda to follow.   
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So what conclusions can be made concerning policy-making specifically for 
NASA?  Contrary to Schulman, nonincremental policies such as the space shuttle 
program or the space station are decided upon even without the appropriate amount of 
political and resource commitment that may be deemed necessary.  And contrary to 
Krasner, the bureaucracy often has a say in presidential policy-making whether the 
president likes it or not.  Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that policy-
making is never absolute; it is not one thing or the other.  Policy-making, again, is not 
done in a vacuum- a ringing theme throughout this chapter.  Other factors must be 
considered when considering policy; presidential support will not cut it not will 
bureaucratic pressure.  What that leads us to is the Congress and its power of the purse. 
The Congress and Budgeting 
 For all of the pronouncements of wanting to cut spending and balance the budget, 
every year, the US budget seems to get larger and larger.  From pork barrel spending to 
hurricane recovery and the war on terror, particularly now, the US budget seems to be a 
magnet for higher totals.  Nothing can be done unless money for it is appropriated and 
approved of by the Congress; this makes an examination of budgeting incredibly 
important.  When policies such as the Vision for Space Exploration or the space shuttle 
program is announced by the president, it must also be approved of by the Congress in 
the form of money and authorization.  Indeed, Greenberg writes, “the politics of science 
is registered in money awarded or denied.”53   
 In his classic study of the budgetary process, Aaron Wildavsky explores the 
process from both sides of the equation:  those who request the money and those who 
authorize and appropriate it.  What is of most concern here, however, is his theory of 
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“fair share.”  Fair share, according to Wildavsky, “reflects a convergence of expectations 
on roughly how much the agency is to receive in comparison to others.”54  This 
expectation, gathered from years of experience influences expectations and requests.  
Similarly, after a period of time, there also exists an agreement on an agency’s “base,” 
which is the expectation that the budget for the agency will continue at current levels.55  
Thus, the fair share and the base work in conjunction to provide the agency with an 
estimate of what it should expect in the budget for the coming year.  But there can be 
disagreement over what each of these concepts will represent in any given year as current 
events may influence beliefs as to the value of the given agency and its actions.56
 What Wildavsky explains, then, is that even though there is general agreement 
every year concerning what an agency will receive, a little wiggle room is left for any 
adjustments that might be deemed necessary.  But how do you place a value on actions or 
policies?  How does the Congress deem what is valuable and what is not?  Some may 
argue that public opinion influences representatives and senators in the Congress and that 
they will perform according to public will.  Gabriel Almond writes:  “Popular opinion 
may be viewed as ‘latent policy’ and ‘latent politics.’  It not only indicates potential 
changes in public policy and the political elite, it is a most significant component of that 
public policy and must be understood and appreciated if a proper estimate of the meaning 
of that policy is to be made.”57  Thus, if the public feels compelled to support a particular 
program or policy, then it is likely that its budget may be raised in the coming year. 
 This concept raises two questions:  one, what is the mechanism by which public 
opinion influences congress and two, the validity of public opinion and the measure of 
public opinion.  In considering the first question, we must also consider whether public 
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opinion influences leaders at all.  Jacobs cites quantitative research that finds public 
opinion has a significant effect on policy-making yet Jacobs with Lawrence, Shapiro, and 
Smith write that the public’s “influence on substantive policy decisions of individual 
members is quite modest.”58  Using a survey of “congressional participants,” Jacobs, 
Lawrence, Shapiro, and Smith found that though surveys were paid attention to, they did 
not influence congressmen and women quite as much as would be expected for two 
reasons:  one, perceptions of unreliable surveys and two, “insistence on following their 
own convictions.”59   
 Addressing the second question, while surveys can be great tools for scholars and 
leaders alike, there are many recognized limits to them.  They may not be completely 
representative of the targeted population or the wording may influence reactions and 
answers.  Indeed, numbers can be made to appear however one would like them to 
appear.  Knowing these limits to survey data can certainly impede one’s usage of the 
knowledge.  If the survey is not representational of the district the congress member 
represents, then what is the point of using the knowledge the survey offers?   
 Years of slow economic growth, fewer dollars being taken in as taxes, and 
defense needs can put a great strain on the yearly budget.  For instance, in recent years, 
the US Congress has had to authorize and appropriate billions of dollars for Hurricane 
Katrina recovery and the war on terrorism.  With such pressing needs, the discretionary 
budget can often become strained.  As a result, those funded from discretionary accounts 
such as NASA begin to feel the pinch.  Thus, while “space exploration is supported as an 
ideal… when forced to choose between supporting space and some other social priority, 
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the public’s choice is usually to support the other priority as more socially necessary.”60  
It is also generally the Congress’s choice as well.   
Decline 
 Wilson and Schulman both focused on it and as previously discussed, many of the 
characteristics associated with it, do not fit in the government sphere.  Decline and what 
is meant by decline is something that is often neglected throughout the literature on 
NASA.  A throwaway term, many use it simply to describe the categorization that NASA 
is not the agency that it used to be.  The problem lies, however, in not properly defining 
the term so that its meaning may be at best ambiguous and at worst ill-informed.  This 
discussion will proceed as follows:  first, a review of Downs’s, McCurdy’s, and 
Schulman’s conceptualization of decline and second, an examination of the 
characteristics of define listed in chapter one and reprinted here. 
The Theorists 
 Downs’s examines decline from the point of view of his life-cycle theory.  As the 
agency becomes older, it is less capable of being innovative and dynamic.  As the agency 
ages, its standard operating procedures become hardened, its period of rapid growth is 
tempered, and the employee make-up changes.  Bureaucracy, the endless paper and 
pencil pushing, increases, and changes are harder to make.  Downs takes this transition to 
be a normal result of age that may damage the agency.  Yet in government, paperwork 
and bureaucracy are hallmarks of the established bureaucracy.  A paper trail and standard 
operating procedures are the norm so as to ensure fairness and prevent corruption.  
Agencies are created to make operations more standard and predictable so is conservative 
really all that bad? 
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 To relate this to NASA, certainly, the agency has changed from its early days.  
Any new agency needs to rapidly expand to create offices and workspaces and employees 
to run the agency.  At some point growth will inevitably level off and that is not 
necessarily bad.  A smaller workforce may mean greater efficiency or be a symptom of 
falling budget levels for whatever reason.  It seems clear from the analysis of NASA’s 
history in chapter two that NASA did indeed become more conservative following the 
1960s, but it has also attempted to be innovative in recent times, signified by its 
acceptance of the Vision for Space Exploration.  While Downs admits that some 
rejuvenation may be possible for an agency if it undergoes significant periods of growth, 
NASA is not going through such a period yet it is taking on new activities.   
 Related to Downs, McCurdy takes a similar viewpoint on what decline is to mean.  
In answering the questions of whether NASA has experience more bureaucracy and/or 
conservatism, McCurdy accepts Downs definition of decline:  an increasingly 
conservative organization characterized by more bureaucracy and conservatism.  While 
McCurdy’s analysis may have been relevant in the early 1990s when his piece was 
written, in light of recent events, it may not be so anymore.  Increased budgetary pressure 
overall has not led to the Congress rejecting the VSE and conservatism has not led to 
NASA rejecting it either.  Without an influx of growth, NASA seems to be pursuing a 
radical new program under tough budget conditions.  None of this situation seems to 
mesh well with either Downs or McCurdy. 
 When Schulman discusses decline, he discusses it in the performance sense or in 
other words, that their performance has declined.  This varies from the previous 
definition of decline in that for Downs and McCurdy the agency declined.  Thus, does 
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declining performance equal a declining agency?  Clearly, what the agency does, how it 
performs, is essential to an overall evaluation of agency itself, therefore it must be 
considered in conjunction with other factors.  Schulman makes a point to note the 
“exodus” of personnel from the space program from the 1960s, which left the agency 
with a deficit of “imaginative and capable personnel.”61  As discussed above, this draws 
parallels to Downs’s life-cycle theory and makes it all the more evident that Schulman is 
analyzing relatively the same thing as Downs. 
 The point that Schulman attempts to make in this discussion of decline, however, 
is that “These space exploration declines- in public support, appropriations, personnel, 
morale, organizational structure and performance- all illustrate the fundamental 
instability inherent all the nonincremental policy enterprise.”62  Schulman tries to make 
the argument that the support surrounding nonincremental policies fluctuates.  If the 
support fell so dramatically, though, then why was the space shuttle approved of as a 
follow-on program?  Indeed, public support for the space agency has been remarkably 
consistent over time (though certainly not deep and only as a second tier concern) and 
NASA has continued to have money authorized and appropriated for its use.63  While 
already concluding that Downs and Schulman are discussing essentially the same thing, it 
should also be clear by this point that Schulman is not describing nonincremental policies 
as a whole, but simply the decision to go to the moon.  The incredible circumstances 
surrounding the moon landing decision including Cold War politics, the launch of 
Sputnik, and domestic political concerns are unique characteristics perhaps endemic to 
that one period in history.  Thus, for Schulman’s argument to be more persuasive, we 
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would need to be provided with a greater range and variety of examples of 
nonincremental policies.   
 One other author that has focused on decline specifically in government agencies 
is Charles H. Levine.  Levine theorizes four causes of what he calls “public organization 
decline:” political vulnerability, problem depletion, organizational atrophy, and 
environmental atrophy.64  Levine writes “No organization is immune from these 
problems and no organization is likely to be afflicted by them all at once, but a heavy 
dose of some of these breakdowns in combination can contribute to an organization’s 
decline and even death.”65  Levine identifies these causes in order to explicate 
management schemes that can attempt to reduce or smooth the supposed decline; 
Levine’s focus is on managing the organizational change but his four identified causes 
can be examined for insights applicable here. 
 Interestingly enough, when examining political vulnerability, Levine believes that 
age is the best predictor of this characteristic. He writes that “Contrary to biological 
reasoning, aged organizations are more flexible than young organizations and therefore 
rarely die or even shrink much.”66  This argument is quite different from the ones that we 
have examined previously and the only argument he uses to back up this proposition is 
that over time, organizations have learned different adaptive abilities.  From the evidence 
examined previously, I must disagree with Levine.  As the organization gets older, it 
becomes more established, more situated, firming up its constituency and engraining its 
procedures into institutional memory.  Therefore, one would think that as the 
organization ages, its political vulnerability would decrease.  While NASA’s ability to 
survive catastrophes and falling budgets may provide evidence for Levine’s argument, 
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NASA’s flexibility has been in the details and not the major objective.  The main goal 
has always been human spaceflight with merely the means being flexible over time. 
 Moving on to Levine’s second characteristic, problem depletion, this one seems a 
bit more plausible.  Levine posits that this is the “most familiar” problem for government 
organizations; once the political definition of an agency’s mission has run its course or 
through a cycle (such as natural disasters or defense), the organization has no more 
problems to deal with in the interim.67  What reason do the organizations that deal with 
cyclical problems have to exist in the meantime?  Common sense would tell us that they 
must prepare and re-supply themselves in between missions or federal disasters.  For 
example, FEMA in between major disaster declarations in which their help is requested 
and/or required must restock, plan, and reexamine what happened in the last event.  In 
this way, they continue to be prepared for any possible contingency.  Since no one knows 
when or where FEMA or the military may be needed, they do not cease to exist in the 
meantime.  Problem depletion therefore does not necessarily equal a decline or 
organizational change as Levine argues. 
 Organizational atrophy most closely resembles the characteristics we will 
examine next.  Among the list of “management failures” that Levine uses are:  weak 
oversight, internal atrophy, stifled dissent and upward communication, continuous 
reorganization, lack of self-evaluating, and authority with vague responsibility.68  Any 
one of these could be argued to be characteristics influenced by the government as a 
whole and inapplicable to any individual agency.  For example, weak oversight would be 
the fault of the Congress, not of the agency itself.  Continuous reorganization will usually 
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only happen at the behest of those who oversee agencies after they have identified 
problems with the agency.   
 The final cause of government decline that Levine identifies is environmental 
atrophy.  Levine says that this occurs “when the capacity of the environment to support 
the public organization at prevailing levels of activity erodes.”69  While not examining 
this idea much further than giving some examples, Levine argues that this lack of 
resources can significantly reduce what the organization can do, which is only logical.  
And as will be explained in the next chapter, is the change in resources that I argue is the 
main cause of organizational change. 
 Levine’s main focus is not on the causes of decline however, but how to manage 
for those periods.  What Levine neglects, though, is the influence of the rest of the 
government on how the agency manages.  If an agency can foresee a period of cutbacks, 
then without the requisite funds, they may have problems in performing their duties.  
With political pressure coming from both executive and legislative branches, the agency 
may be forced to do more with less, which causes problems of its own.  The agency only 
has so much leeway to do as they please, a constraint that plays as much into how the 
agency is run as what caused it in the first place. 
The Characteristics 
 In chapter one, the characteristics presented in the following table were briefly 
discussed as not being applicable to government agencies.  Here, I will go further in 
depth about each of these characteristics, which could be described as characteristic of 
the decline literature as a whole. 
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Table 0-1:  Characteristics of Organizational Decline 
Characteristics Sources 
Increasing conflict Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Increasing rigidity Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Decreasing morale Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Lack of innovation Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Elimination of slack resources Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987 
Concern with survival Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Inability to adapt Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing sales Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing profits Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Increasing competition Weitzel and Jonsson 1989 
Decreasing capacity for innovation McCurdy 1991 
Decreasing flexibility McCurdy 1991 
Decreasing number or excess of personnel Whetten 1980; Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Decreasing demand for services Whetten 1980 
Lack of clear goals Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Loss of effective communication Lorange and Nelson 1987 
Outdated structure Lorange and Nelson 1987 
  
   
 These characteristics can ideally be divided into two different categories, ones 
that NASA or the individual agency may or may not have control over directly, and ones 
that have to do with the rest of the government.  To aid in this analysis, I will employ this 
designation. 
Government Responsibility 
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim succinctly summarize the characteristics of decline 
as presented in the literature as such:  “Increases in conflict, secrecy, scapegoating, self-
protective behaviors, rigidity, and turnover and decreases in morale, innovativeness, 
participation, and long-term planning are among the common problems associated with 
decline.”70  As suitable a place to begin with as any, many of these characteristics are 
simply not applicable to government operations.  Conflict, when it occurs over policy, 
often happens at the top (in the executive branch) and only over the most controversial 
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policies.  Conflict within an agency, though, may be little to none once the agency has 
established itself.  From what we have seen previously, government agencies settle into 
this repetitive functioning replete with standard operating procedures that are designed to 
reduce conflict.   
 Secrecy and scapegoating may be considered by some to be an epidemic among 
the government as a whole.  Does the entire government decline then?  Secrecy in the 
foreign policy or domestic security apparatus may be absolutely essential.  Laws such as 
the Freedom of Information Act ensure that public records are available.  When talking 
about people in particular, if something wrong has been done, there is generally a “fall 
guy” identified that takes the blame for failed policies.  This occurs within government at 
a startling pace.  But again, does this mean that government as a whole declines?  Most 
likely, the answer to that question is a no. 
NASA certainly cannot be blamed for a lack of innovation.  While they are 
utilizing thirty plus year old technology now on the space shuttle, NASA has upgraded to 
use newer technology on the shuttle and develop new space technologies depending on 
its budget.  One of the problems that one runs into though, is whether the technology 
keeps a pace with the times.  If NASA is not innovative enough it could be that the 
technology has not changed rapidly enough to allow for it.  If technology development is 
slow, then it is certainly not NASA’s fault and thus not significant of a decline.  The 
same could be said to be true for any government research and development agency such 
as the National Institutes of Health.  Technological change needs to be considered and 
lack of not blamed on respective agencies. 
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 Cameron, Whetten, and Kim also identify an “elimination of slack resources like 
contingency accounts, reserves, or new projects” as symptomatic of decline.71  This at 
times may not be at the agency’s choosing; the Congress may well dictate what accounts 
get cut, changed, or rolled back.  When talking about a government agency, the context in 
which it operates must be taken into account and this is one of those times.  Criticisms of 
the number of field centers that NASA possesses are abundant at times with repeated 
cries of redundant operations.  Yet these field centers are in no danger of being cut.  Once 
established, the chances of an agency being dismantled or a field center dissolved are 
incredibly slim.  Simply by being a government agency, survival is all but guaranteed. 
 Finally, lack of long-term planning and flexibility is identified as a part of decline.  
The essence of NASA’s operations requires long-term planning and in any case, that 
long-term planning, the policy-making, is contingent on the executive and the legislative 
branches.  In many cases it is difficult for either branch to pursue long-term planning, 
even in the case of NASA.  The budget is never guaranteed every year and circumstances 
may develop that prohibit funding agencies at the level that would be required.  While 
having a long-term budget guaranteed would be nice and beneficial, but as discussed in 
chapter two and here in chapter three, it is often difficult to do such. 
Agency Responsibility 
 While they are fewer in number than the characteristics that are affected by the 
government as a whole, the following characteristics can often be controlled by the 
agency at hand.  It should be kept in mind, however, that the government as a whole may 
still affect an agency in these matters.  
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Higher personnel turnover is an interesting case.  In the 1960s, when NASA was, 
by most standards, considered to be at the height of its performance, turnover was quite 
high.  If we go by this characteristic then, NASA in the 1960s would be undergoing a 
decline.  In actuality, turnover has decreased throughout the decades in NASA at the 
same time pronouncements of decline have risen. 
 Decreasing morale is another characteristic Cameron, Whetten, and Kim identify.  
While I know of no comprehensive, government wide survey of satisfaction with 
employment, the data provided by McCurdy’s study of NASA employees in the early 
1990s provide us with some evidence.  But again, enthusiasm for the job may not 
necessarily be requisite for a successful agency. 
 Decreasing sales, profits, and demand for services, and increasing competition, 
have little to no applicability for government agencies at all.  The bulk, if not all, of them 
are run to provide public services, which do not incur costs.  As such, no profits and/or 
sales are unable to be tracked.  Often times, these agencies are the only agencies that 
provide a public good or service and experience no competition for them.  In particular 
relation to NASA, other space agencies both public and private can provide some sort of 
competition for launch services but generally, government agencies do not experience 
competition for services. 
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CHAPTER 3:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF NASA, 1970-2005 
 
 As noted previously, this brief review of NASA history is designed to fill two 
holes in the literature:  NASA’s performance and intergovernmental relations beyond the 
big decisions and disasters.  As such, I will play special attention to these topics in each 
of the following sections.  I have divided, for ease of discussion, this 35-year period into 
seven distinct time periods:  (1) post-Apollo and the Shuttle decision, (2) Shuttle 
development and early operations, (3) post-Challenger, (4) planning for and 
implementing the International Space Station, (5) the 1990s, (6) post-Columbia, and (7) 
Constellation.   
Post-Apollo and the Shuttle Decision 
 In order to put the shuttle decision in its proper context, we must go back to the 
mid-1960s, before the Apollo program had even gotten off the ground and before the 
moon was even within reach.  In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson asked NASA for 
recommendations as to what the future of America in space should be once the Apollo 
program was over.1  Unfortunately for NASA, in the race to the moon, it had yet to 
concern themselves with any sort of follow-on program or mechanism for planning one- 
a criticism that might be seen to haunt the agency to this day.2  The irony is that at that 
time, in 1964, NASA was seen as one of the most progressive, future-forward agencies 
involved in the government; yet this same organization neglected to address its future 
beyond the current program.  With all resources focused squarely on the task at hand, it 
appeared difficult for the agency to see anything beyond it. 
 While the lack of planning for the future continued, the planning for Apollo 
continued on.  When Apollo 11 reached the moon in July 1969, public enthusiasm for the 
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program was already falling; the percent of people who believed that space funding 
should be decreased increased dramatically from 5% of the public in 1968 to 56% of the 
public in 1975.3  This created a problem for NASA which, without any sort of follow on 
program, would lose all reason for existence.  A cascade of other problems evolved from 
this very question of survival:  thousands of civil servants employed by NASA depended 
on it, an industry full of aerospace companies that had been mobilized to support Apollo 
were now left without any contracts, and NASA, above all, wanted to “maintain its 
bureaucracy and its primacy as a technological organization.”4  The problem that was 
foreseen by one of the earliest supporters of spaceflight, Lyndon Johnson, had come 
home to roost before the echoes of the cheers for Apollo 11 had even ended. 
 In response to this looming crisis, Vice President Spiro Agnew and his Space 
Task Group released a report in the summer of 1969 concerning future NASA programs.  
While this report put forward numerous proposals for the future, the group could not 
agree on a single approach that would recommend itself on its merits.5  This inconclusive 
report was actually a sign of what really was occurring:  no one knew what the space 
program should do now that it had beaten the Soviets to the moon and won the so-called 
Space Race.   
 NASA’s bureaucratic drive pushed for survival; survival in turn meant that it 
would continue to receive the type and amount of funding that it had received for the 
previous decade.  For NASA, this meant coming up with some type of program involving 
human spaceflight, which would require a large amount of funds.  But NASA’s drive for 
survival did not mesh well with the outside political environment.  Public support for the 
program dwindled following the moon landings and the Vietnam War was eating up 
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more and more of the national budget.  Without the willingness of the Congress to fund 
and without the money to fund as noted above, NASA would not be able to get what they 
absolutely wanted- a brand new program that would provide the funding it was 
accustomed to.  To counter this, NASA attempted to “rekindle public support” for an 
“expansive and expensive” human spaceflight program.6
 Aside from questions concerning funding and public support, there existed very 
real questions concerning the need for the US to remain in space.  Logsdon writes that 
“In 1971, as the debate over whether to approve the space shuttle reached its climax, 
NASA Administrator James Fletcher argued to the White House that ‘for the US not be 
in space, while others do have men in space, is unthinkable, and it is a position which 
America cannot accept.’”7  But some questioned the very need to have humans in space 
at all, something that continues to be relevant today.8  James Van Allen, the very Van 
Allen who discovered radiation belts surrounding the Earth wrote that “Almost all of the 
space program’s important advances in scientific knowledge have been accomplished by 
hundreds of robotic spacecraft” without the presence of humans.9   
 NASA certainly has pursued a number of scientific missions, but at its core, the 
pursuit of human spaceflight has colored NASA’s ambitions for its future.10  As such, 
NASA, sensing the political situation, pushed the space shuttle as a suitable follow-on 
program that would cost approximately $5.2 billon “less than an expendable alternative 
for performing the same mission.”11  NASA claimed that the shuttle would accomplish 
two main objectives:  reduce the cost of spaceflight and “provide a future capability 
designed to support a wide range of scientific, defense, and commercial use.”12 Extolling 
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its virtues of cost-effectiveness and reusability, NASA claimed that the shuttle would be a 
workhorse that would eventually pay for itself.13  
 The biggest justification that NASA used for a new program, and in particular the 
space shuttle, was that it would be very economical.14  This judgment would in turn be 
supported by a number of factors including a high number of flights by the shuttle and 
cost-savings that a reusable system would garner over an expendable launch system.15 
The shuttle would be able to perform a variety of functions in low-Earth orbit including 
retrieving and repairing satellites and scientific experiments and launching defense and 
commercial payloads. This increased focus on the economic advantages and a wide 
variety of uses highlights the changing times.  While Apollo did not have to be seen as an 
economic or technological benefit, a new program would; a variety of activities for the 
shuttle to perform would also give the program a wider base of constituencies and thus a 
wider base of support.  No longer could NASA rely on public opinion to spur it on or the 
space race to give it an edge in the budgetary process. 
 From all of these constraints, emerged the space shuttle option- a reusable fleet of 
space vehicles that would provide cheap and reliable access to space for commercial and 
scientific programs.  Emerging from Agnew’s Space Task Group and NASA leadership, 
the space shuttle seemed to be the only feasible option for NASA.  The space shuttle 
would attempt to satisfy the requirements of a number of constituencies that would fill 
the void of support left by falling public opinion.  It could perform commercial 
operations such as retrieving, repairing, and releasing satellites and performing valuable 
commercial zero-g manufacturing experiments.  The DOD would also be able to use the 
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shuttles to perform military operations.  And science would be aided in the capabilities of 
the shuttle to perform and release long-term experiments in space. 
Of course, the decision to support the shuttle was a very political decision- Nixon 
“did not wish to go down in history as the president who ended the era of man in space” 
but this political decision had very real political consequences.16  Yet, the Vietnam War 
was consuming more and more of the national budget and attention with the space 
program falling from public favor at the same time.   Without due consideration of the 
ultimate goals that the country wished to use NASA to achieve, the space shuttle decision 
would set the stage for the next thirty-five years.  Logsdon traces the basic failure of 
national space policy to this shuttle decision:  “The reality that national space policy did 
not bring ambitions and resources into balance in the 1970s, nor in the subsequent two 
decades, is the basic policy failure.”17   
 This decision has also led NASA to unduly place all its efforts on the space 
shuttle, pushing it to operational status in the 1980s and pushing to keep the program 
going in the 1990s.18  Logsdon is not the only one to fault this decision for many of the 
events that would happen years later.  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also 
blamed the “compromises hammered out by the White House and NASA headquarters” 
for turning NASA into “more of a business, with schedules, production pressures, 
deadlines, and cost efficiency goals elevated to the level of technical innovation and 
safety goals.”19
Performance 
 There is no doubt that NASA lived up to expectations in landing twelve men on 
the moon and returning them home safely.  Indeed, up until the Apollo 1 fire, there were 
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no questions concerning NASA’s performance.  Even in the beginning of the 1970s, 
these questions had yet to be raised.  Yet there are serious questions as to why NASA 
pushed the shuttle as hard as it did.  Greenberg, in his study of science and politics, offers 
one explanation. 
In a profession built on numeracy and dedicated to accuracy, what accounts for 
these topsy-turvy misstatements of fact?  The complaints and the mangling of 
financial data without doubt reflected actual distress, principally of a localized 
nature:  the number of money-seeking scientists was growing faster than the 
money.  Lacking any real political power… science employed desperate appeals, 
in which precision took second place to propaganda.20
 
 NASA wanted its future, it wanted to survive, and thus it needed guaranteed 
funding, which would come in the form of a human spaceflight program.  While this 
might not be so much a question of performance of an individual program, NASA’s 
pushing of the shuttle using reasons that would turn out to be untrue is indicative of the 
organization’s performance.  It should be noted, though, that the technology involved in 
constructing and designing the shuttle was entirely new; predictions of cost effectiveness 
and reusability may have been believed within NASA.  Actions to cut cost through the 
early phases of construction may have been believed to have no effect on the eventual 
capabilities of the shuttle.  But the overall effect of new technology and budget 
constructions led to a program that did not live up to its promises. 
NASA should certainly not be singled out for pushing a program that it believed 
in; many other agencies and organizations are cheerleaders of plans that they believe are 
good or could be successful.  But rather than engage in a debate concerning space’s 
proper place in US politics and policy, NASA took the easy way out.  Knowing the 
political environment in which it operated, NASA compromised; rather than recommend 
a program that would truly lead to innovation and success such as continuation of the X 
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program that led to the development of the X-15, NASA pushed a program that would get 
it money and contracts in the short term.   
 Immediately following the decision to proceed with the space shuttle program, 
criticisms of the cost analysis that NASA used to support it began to appear.  The General 
Accounting Office (GAO, now known as the Government Accountability Office) 
produced two reports at the request of Senator Walter Mondale analyzing the cost-benefit 
analysis that NASA had produced.  In both of these reports, the GAO was highly critical 
of the pronouncements of economic viability and the shuttle’s advantages over other 
programs.21  This criticism and suspicion of NASA’s own reports highlights the changing 
times that the agency was going through with respect to relations with the legislative and 
executive branches.  In the 1960s, all it took was presidential support and congressional 
appropriations without any good justifications for what NASA would undertake.  Now, 
Congress did not even trust NASA’s own word for the shuttle’s advantages and were 
openly showing suspicion.   
 Though it was certainly worried, was NASA’s concern for its survival actually 
irrational?  As has been demonstrated by so many government agencies, once they have 
been brought into existence, they very rarely ever get shut down.  This would mean that 
NASA’s concern for survival existed either because it wrongly perceived that the agency 
was on the chopping block or it simply wanted to maintain the current budget.  As we 
have seen, Nixon would not have ended human spaceflight for a variety of political 
reasons including his own legacy and the America’s standing in the world at large.  Even 
though the Space Race had been won, the standing still had to be maintained.  One could 
then conclude that NASA was not so much concerned with its survival, as survival was 
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all but guaranteed, but maintaining the funding levels that they had become accustomed 
to as human spaceflight was not necessarily guaranteed.   
Intragovernmental Relations 
 NASA’s compromises are clear examples of how NASA negotiated its political 
environment.  Recognizing the increased funding that the Vietnam War was drawing and 
the fall in public opinion, NASA decided to recommend the shuttle, which it believed 
would be cost-effective and the minimum that would be required to keep the US in space.  
With the fall in public support for the program and the success of the US in the space 
race, those in Congress did not feel the same amount of pressure from constituents at 
home in the early 1970s for continued US involvement in space as they did in the late 
1950s after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union. 
 In negotiating the pitfalls of legislative and executive relations, NASA decided to 
take the road that would get the most support, regardless of whether it was the right road 
or not.  With supporters in the aerospace, defense, and commercial industries, NASA did 
not have to rely on public opinion and in turn their representatives’ support in the 
Congress.  While it would ultimately have to be Congress that would appropriate the 
money for the program, the pressure from industry would replace the pressure from the 
folks at home.  Recognizing this political shift, NASA exploited the supposed wide 
variety of tasks that the shuttle would be able to perform and its economy.  
The Lost Promises of the STS:  Shuttle Development and Early Operations 
 Once the decision to proceed with the space shuttle program had been made, 
progress continued into the developmental phases.  The program was not even three years 
old when problems began to creep up.  In a report from the GAO in 1975, NASA was 
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already experiencing delays of up to a year, rising costs, and falling budgets.22  Just a 
year later, in 1976, another GAO report identified continuing issues with the program 
including increased development time, less testing, and falling contingency reserves for 
the agency.23
 As the development problems increased, the economic justifications for the 
program became increasingly uncertain.  The same 1976 GAO report indicated that for 
the economic justifications to be valid, NASA would require a stable budget of $3.3 
billion in 1972 dollars.24  A relatively stable and predictable budget level is never a 
guarantee for any government agency and this unpredictability coupled with higher 
development costs and lower expectations for the shuttle combined together to put in 
doubt the original economic justification for the shuttle and put the program at higher 
risk.25
 What is also interesting about the shuttle justification and developmental phase is 
the participation of the Department of Defense (DOD).  The DOD had committed (over 
the objections of the Air Force) to using the shuttle for all of its military payloads once 
the shuttle had reached operational status and proven all of its capabilities.26  Among the 
reasons stated for this reliance include:  reduced launch costs, improved payload 
reliability, and phase-out of expendable launch vehicles and their various launch 
complexes.27  While dependence on the shuttle would no doubt be cost-effective for the 
military, it is only cost-effective if and when the shuttle reaches its performance and 
operational goals.  Further, there was no guarantee of a specific number of payloads from 
the DOD and those that would be required would need to get into geosynchronous orbit 
from the low-Earth orbit achieved by the shuttle. 
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 The requirement of geosynchronous orbit would either require an additional 
booster on shuttle that would allow it to reach the higher orbit or what would be termed a 
“space tug.”  This space tug would provide an additional reusable propulsion system that 
could place payloads in the higher orbit.  By 1976, the space tug had been delayed until 
late 1985, which would leave the military with a gap of approximately 4-5 years until 
which payloads could be placed in a higher orbit.28   
 Additionally, DOD’s reliance on the space shuttle would lead to a major 
consequence that would be unseen until Challenger in 1986.  With the shuttle reaching 
operational status, the military’s stock of expendable launch vehicles was being phased 
out.  When the shuttle Challenger exploded 51 seconds into its mission, it meant a 
temporary stop in all shuttle launches until the cause of failure could be determined and 
changes made to the program.  This effectively left the DOD with no launch options of its 
payloads for some time.  As we will see further down, the DOD would abandon its 
commitment to the shuttle program following Challenger highly damaging the already 
fragile program. 
 Another aspect of DOD participation was the possibility of the military buying 
two orbiters that would be refurbished from testing status.  The purchase would ensure 
the military a platform from which to launch its payloads but it also brings to light many 
questions concerning military involvement in a civilian agency.  Indeed, these questions 
have haunted NASA before there even was a NASA.  Dwight Eisenhower’s concerns 
about military control of a space program eventually led him to conclude that a civilian 
agency would be the most appropriate venue to pursue space exploration.  But as we have 
seen, with NASA’s needs of a wide constituency base, it was almost forced to view the 
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DOD as a partner in human spaceflight from the beginning.  With the defense industry 
and the DOD behind it, NASA hoped to make up for lost popular support in the 
Congress.   
Table 0-1:  Space Shuttle Projected versus Actual 
Space Shuttle Features Projected Actual 
Shuttle Design, 
Development, Test, and 
Evaluation 
$5.15 billion $5.67 billion 
Number of Orbiters 5 4 
Production Cost of Orbiters $1 billion $2.64 billion 
Number of Flights, through 
1990 
581 38 plus 5 test flights 
Cost per Flight $10.45 million $750 million 
All budget figures in 1971 dollars 
Sources:  GAO:  Space Transportation System, February 1975, pg. 2 
     NASA Historical Data Book Vol. 5, pg.  260 
     NASA Historical Data Book Vol. 3, tables 2-24, 2-29 
     Space.com.  <http://www.space.com/news/shuttle_cost_050211.html>.   
 
 In 1982, the space shuttle officially became operational.  It was not without its 
problems, however.  Only two orbiters were in use, per flight costs were still highly over 
budget, and turn-around times for orbiters between flights were astronomical compared to 
the original planned estimate.  For example, in 1983, five fully operational flights were 
planned at a cost of $266 million each and projected turn-around times by the 26th flight 
was expected to be 888 man-hours as compared to NASA’s goal of 160 hours.29  This 
combination of higher cost per flight and fewer flights would put into doubt the original 
projections of the project just as it had become operational. 
 With the shuttle pushed to operational status, the question also arose of who 
would operate the space shuttle program. Since Project Mercury, the original human 
spaceflight program, NASA had always had the responsibility to develop and operate 
 57
manned spaceflight missions.  Yet the human spaceflight programs of the 1960s never 
had as their stated goals, low-cost and reliable human spaceflight.  If sending humans into 
space was to be made reliable and operational, the question arose as to whether NASA, 
an agency focused primarily on research and development, should operate it.30
 As demonstrated by Challenger and Columbia, the job of putting humans into 
space using the shuttle will never be made into the reliable system that many had hoped 
for.  Placing responsibility for systems like weather satellites, COMSAT (a 
communications satellite system) and LANDSAT does make operational sense but these 
systems do not involve placing human lives at risk.  Even though a system is operational 
does not mean that the risk is 100% gone. 
Performance 
 Again, NASA experienced a number of performance issues in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  These issues were not so much evident in specific programs living or not 
living up to their goals, but overall agency operations.  Two major problems will be 
addressed here:  NASA cost-estimates and early shuttle capabilities.  These two issues are 
intertwined, but will be examined in turn. 
 NASA’s cost-estimates for the shuttle program beginning with their initial 
estimates in 1971 were shown to be grossly off track.  In each of the GAO reports on the 
shuttle that I have examined, the GAO consistently criticizes NASA’s cost-estimating 
and budgeting processes.  In its 1976 report on the shuttle program’s progress, the GAO 
reported that NASA had failed to include in-house development costs for the shuttle and 
its components, “changes in the shuttle’s development plan have reduced the probability 
of meeting cost and performance goals,” and “the innovative design and refurbishment 
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techniques which account for much of the projected payload savings are controversial 
issues.”31  It appears from the report’s findings that NASA left some costs of 
development out so as to make the projected cost of the program appear lower.  Again, 
we face the question of whether NASA did this simply to survive or to increase its yearly 
budget intake.  Clearly, not including all applicable costs in the program’s cost, can work 
both ways for NASA.  By making the total cost appear lower, the program looks more 
attractive and more economical.  But, as actual costs have shown, by intentionally 
keeping the projected budget lower, NASA left less room for error in the development 
phase. 
 This intentional lowering of projected costs not only left NASA little room for 
technical problems but also led to cutting the shuttle’s capabilities.  The GAO noted that 
this led to two questions:  one, will the goals initially set for the shuttle be met and two, 
“how much development can be eliminated and still keep a viable program.”32  The same 
report went on to criticize this approach of deletion of program elements by stating:  “In 
addition, past experience with major civil and defense acquisitions has shown that 
NASA’s development approach can lead to costly retrofit or redesign at a later date or to 
deploying systems that cannot adequately fulfill their intended role.”33   
 The situation foreseen by the GAO in 1976 eventually came to pass once the 
shuttle became operational in 1982.  The true cost of the design deletions would be seen 
in the increased costs per launch and fewer launches.  It is interesting to contemplate 
what might have happened had NASA included all possible costs in its original estimates 
and included all planned elements of the system.  Perhaps the shuttle might have met its 
original stated goals after all or been cancelled because of the huge costs. 
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Intragovernmental Relations 
 In the years comprising the development, testing, and operations of the space 
shuttle, the number of GAO reports concerning the agency increased to a high of ten in 
1977 (for a complete content analysis of GAO reports concerning NASA between 1970 
and 2005, see Appendix I).  This increased interest on the part of the Congress, whose 
members routinely request these reports, demonstrates the increased oversight that NASA 
was experiencing.  Unlike the 1960s when NASA had a fairly wide range of freedom to 
conduct its operations without much oversight and with a blank check signed by 
Congress, the newest generation of human spaceflight experienced much more 
congressional oversight.   
 With less pressure from constituents at home, the Congress did not have as much 
pressure to completely fund a space program.  Between 1972 and 1982, the General 
Social Survey found that 74% of people asked about the amount of money being spent on 
the space program responded that it was “about right” or “too much.”34  The 1970s 
actually saw the cooperation of the US and the Soviet Union in space in the form of the 
Apollo-Soyuz test program.  The space race and its money was over and NASA was now 
experiencing what most government agencies experience- the normal budgetary process.  
What is interesting about the 1970s, however, is the lack of involvement in the space 
program by the executive branch, namely the president.  Once Nixon had made the 
decision to go with the space shuttle, the presidents of that decade had very little to do 
with the program.  While NASA worked with the Office of Management and Budget (an 
executive agency) on various budgets, direct involvement with the Oval Office was very 
little. 
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Challenger 
 The long simmering doubts about the abilities of the space shuttle would come to 
a sudden head on January 28, 1986.  Just moments into its flight, the shuttle Challenger 
disintegrated when an o-ring in one of its boosters failed bringing the shuttle program to a 
halt.  While the faulty o-ring would eventually be deemed the cause of the disaster, the 
accident review board examining Challenger and other analysts would find many more 
systemic problems that had led up to it. 
 Once declared fully operational, the space shuttle program was still not meeting 
the benchmarks that had been set out for it.  As discussed above, the low-cost estimates 
and even lower budgets had led to disastrous cuts from the program and an orbiter that 
did not have all the features promised.  Because of this, turn-around time for the orbiters 
in between missions did not get anywhere near the target of 160-hours that would have 
made possible the 25+ plus flights a year that would in turn have made the program 
economical.  This combination of problems would place much pressure on NASA to push 
the shuttles more to meet their performance targets.   
 Among the pressures felt by NASA was a push to get more shuttle flights in with 
less money, with better results; quicker, better, cheaper.  In this sense, NASA was forced 
to operate more like a business with deadlines and budgets rather than the research and 
development agency it was designed to be.  Once again, the consequences of NASA’s 
actions in the 1970s caught up with them.  The Rogers Commission, the board that 
investigated the Challenger accident, stated that costs of individual shuttle components 
were the primary consideration used by NASA to select contractors for the program.35  
The implicit suggestion made by the commission, then, is that NASA sacrificed safety for 
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cost in the early stages of the program, which is consistent with what has already been 
described.   
 In short, NASA’s own actions, or lack thereof, in support of the belief that the 
shuttle would make human spaceflight more reliable and cost-effective were a major 
cause of Challenger.  The Rogers Commission noted the increased acceleration of shuttle 
flights with less resources available to crew and support staff as a critical cause of the 
accident.36  NASA had set the standards for the shuttle program so high that in the end, it 
did not have the requisite resources to achieve those standards.  Why were these 
standards set so unrealistically high?  Clearly, part of the explanation is that the shuttle 
represented new and untested technology and without knowledge of what exactly it could 
do, the shuttle flight estimates were optimistic.  But perhaps there is a more political 
aspect to this explanation; NASA needed to show the Congress a program that would 
make economical sense and the only way to do that was to set the flight standard 
incredibly high.  Of course, the individual blame for Challenger is not relegated solely to 
this decision, but as the Rogers Commission explained, it was an accident with a history. 
 A major criticism that was made in the wake of Challenger, and also after 
Columbia, was that NASA’s own culture played a role in the incident.  When speaking of 
culture, it is considered the way that the agency does things.37  In McCurdy’s history of 
NASA culture Inside NASA, this change in the way that NASA operates is detailed from 
the 1960s through the 1990s.  In short, what has been shown is that NASA’s technical 
culture with its deference to engineers and the engineering culture had been greatly worn 
away with age.  In the early NASA, “the normalization of risk, the acceptance of failure 
and the anticipation of trouble led to an atmosphere in which these things could be 
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discussed openly.  NASA’s ability to handle risk required open discussions in which mid-
level managers and engineers felt unrestrained in voicing warnings and dissent.”38  With 
age, NASA began to formalize its operations and increase the level of bureaucratization, 
institutionalizing methods and procedures for various occurrences thus stifling this early 
atmosphere of cooperation and acceptance of all the aspects of the challenge of sending 
humans into space.  The Columbia Accident Investigation Board sums this problem up 
nicely showing that the lesson was not fully learned:  “NASA’s Apollo-era research and 
development culture and its prized deference to the technical expertise of its working 
engineers was overridden in the space shuttle era by ‘bureaucratic accountability’- an 
allegiance to hierarchy, procedure, and following the chain of command.  Prior to 
Challenger, the can-do culture was a result not just of years of apparently successful 
launches, but of the cultural belief that the shuttle program’s many structures, rigorous 
procedures, and detailed system of rules were responsible for those successes” and 
failures. 39
 It was not only this formal bureaucracy that contributed to change in NASA 
culture but also the failures it had experienced including the Apollo 1 fire.  In response to 
various failures, NASA became more conservative, “more concerned with not making 
mistakes, and less tolerant of intuitive decisions.”40  Agencies such as NASA that are 
funded with discretionary money by the US Congress cannot afford to be seen as a failing 
agency either; in that case, they risk losing the very funding that could make them 
successful.41  With NASA already taking on the criticism that the shuttle had failed to 
live up to expectations, the pressure was on to get the shuttle operating more effectively 
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and more efficiently.  As a result, concerns about the o-ring that caused the death of the 
seven crewmembers were stifled. 
 Challenger also led to some very practical effects for NASA and the space 
community as a whole.  Because the Department of Defense was to have relied upon the 
shuttle for all of its launching needs, plans had been drawn up by NASA and the DOD to 
effectively shut down the production of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) which could 
have, posed a threat as a cheaper launch alternative to the shuttle.  With the temporary 
grounding of the orbiter fleet until Challenger was fully investigated, the DOD was left 
with no launch options for its payloads.  Thus, the decision was made to keep ELVs in 
service as a launch option for the military and private companies.  This effectively meant 
the end of DOD participation in the shuttle program as it never purchased the two orbiters 
that it had all but committed to. 
 So it was that Challenger confirmed the growing suspicions that the shuttle would 
not and could not live up to its promises.  Why stick with the program then?  At the time, 
there were calls for the program to be ended but the big aerospace companies with their 
lobbying power, actually pushed the Congress to give NASA more funds with which to 
build another orbiter to replace Challenger.  It was also at this time that the International 
Space Station (called Space Station Freedom then) was in early development.  The space 
station would eventually need to be hauled into space piece by piece by the space shuttle, 
which would not only give the shuttle a purpose but also enable Americans to have a 
space station comparable to the Soviet Union’s Mir.   
 More abstractly, however, the US has established a tradition of surviving disaster 
and coming back from it.  Following the Apollo 1 fire, the race to the moon did not stop, 
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but continued on.  The same thing has happened following Challenger and Columbia.  In 
the wake of disasters, Americans exhibit this determination to continue no matter the 
costs and do it better than the last time.  President Ronald Reagan, who was to have given 
his State of the Union address the night of the Challenger accident, addressed the nation 
instead that night.  His words are instructive:   
The future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave.  The 
Challenger crew was pulling us into the future, and we’ll continue to follow 
them….  We’ll continue our quest in space.  There will be more shuttle flights and 
more shuttle crews and, yes, more volunteers, more civilians, and more teachers 
in space.  Nothing ends here; our hopes and our journeys continue.42
 
President George W. Bush echoed these same sentiments following the Columbia 
accident in 2003 but it is interesting to note that, while perhaps not the main cause of 
continuing on with the shuttle program following Challenger, that this sentiment of 
“going on with the mission” and “continuing on” might have played a small role. 
Performance 
 Clearly, Challenger was not the high point of NASA’s performance record.  In 
the wake of the accident, the first major criticisms of NASA’s performance began to 
creep up, however.  Calls for NASA to be restructured or the space program to be ended 
completely were roundly heard.  The consequences of NASA’s decisions in the shuttle 
development phase were bound out to their conclusion.   
 If any good was to have come out of this, it was perhaps the lowering of shuttle 
standards to more realistic expectations.  By this time, no one in government or NASA 
was seeing the program through rose-colored glasses; flights per year were never going to 
meet the goal of 25, shuttle refurbishment between flights was going to take longer, and 
the program was going to cost more and need more resources.  In bringing the standards 
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for the program into a more realistic light, Challenger not only highlighted problems of 
performance for NASA but also lowered future standards for performance. 
Intragovernmental Relations 
 In 1967 following the launch pad fire of Apollo 1 during routine testing, NASA 
was allowed with very little interference to conduct their own investigation into the 
accident.  That was not the case following Challenger.  President Reagan established a 
commission, formally entitled the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident, better known as the Rogers Commission, to investigate the causes 
of the break up of Challenger.  The commission identified the mechanical failure, the o-
ring that directly caused the accident but also spent four chapters examining contributing 
causes to Challenger.  As discussed above, they criticized the very decision-making 
processes that allowed Challenger to launch stating, “If the decision makers had known 
all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch.”43
 That NASA was not allowed to conduct its own investigation is the obvious sign 
of the times that demonstrated NASA’s fallen stance in respect to governmental relations.  
Clearly, if NASA could not be trusted to live up to the standards that had been set for the 
shuttle program to begin with, it could not be trusted to fully investigate what had went 
wrong.  Further, NASA would not have been in a position to identify and critique the 
very decision-making processes and policies that the Rogers Commission identified as 
contributing to the accident.  While having this criticism leveled at them certainly could 
not have been comfortable, it could have saved lives in the end by allowing NASA to 
change these dangerous processes. 
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The International Space Station 
 Even before Challenger and the concerns that it raised, NASA was pushing for a 
new program, fresh on the heels of declaring the shuttle operational.  A space station, 
originating in the 1969 task force report, in low-Earth orbit that would be serviced by the 
shuttle was argued to be the next step in America’s space program.  Nominally argued for 
since the 1950s, many people inside NASA, and out, believed that a space station would 
be a stepping-stone to going back to the moon and onto other worlds.  But NASA, 
sensing that releasing satellites into space would not give the shuttle enough to do, 
pushed the space station to give the shuttle something to do.44  In fact, the space station 
became the next logical step.45
 Putting a continuous American human presence into space also gave NASA a 
chance to regain the popular support that was once again viewing space flight as a routine 
and normal operation.46  Indeed, NASA’s own pronouncements that it could make 
regular, routine access to space for humans into a cost-efficient affair came to work 
against NASA.  Following the initial spectacular launches of the space shuttle, public 
attention to the program waned; perhaps if NASA could launch another program, another 
spectacle, it could continue to draw the public’s attention to its activities. 
 Of course, giving the shuttle something to do and regaining public attention were 
not the only reasons that NASA pushed the space station.  The Soviet Union had placed a 
series of space stations into orbit beginning in the 1970s and was preparing to launch its 
most successful space station, Mir.  Though the Cold War did not give NASA as big of a 
rationale to pursue big expensive projects as it did in the 1960s, the space station still 
came to be “defined by its political rationale.”47  If the Soviets were doing it, then the US 
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had to do it as well.  Ironically, however, the former Soviet Union would come to play an 
important part in the eventual International Space Station. 
 In order to get approval for such an expansive project, NASA would have to take 
the plans to the president, Ronald Reagan.  A Cold Warrior, Reagan was also concerned 
about the economics of the program, particularly coming off of the non-economical space 
shuttle program.  NASA in turn convinced Reagan of the space station’s commercial 
possibilities- zero-gravity manufacturing, the promise of the new drugs developed in 
lower gravity, and other possible commercial ventures.  Klerkx recounts that “When 
Reagan approved the project now known as the International Space Station, commerce- if 
not outright profit- was high on the list of his motivations for doing so; in fact, had 
NASA not convinced Reagan that industrial suitors interested in lucrative microgravity 
research and manufacturing could eventually turn the station into a for-profit enterprise, it 
probably wouldn’t have been built.”48  Greenberg seems to confirm this by arguing 
“Reagan began his presidency with announced plans to reduce the government’s civilian 
budget, including research, by substantial amounts.”49  That we should see Reagan go 
ahead and endorse an expensive space project after announcing his intention to cut the 
budget demonstrates the apparent strength of the economic arguments that NASA used in 
justifying the space station and Reagan’s enthusiasm for space overall. 
 When Reagan finally approved the space station known as Freedom, the long 
process of development and design began.  Much like the space shuttle, various designs 
and options were examined all while the costs of the program skyrocketed- a total of 
seven project redesigns with a reduced budget to just over a billion dollars.50 With NASA 
suffering from the aftermath of Challenger and repeated budget cuts to the space station 
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budget, it would be 1988 until a “final” design of the space station would be approved.  
This final design would be short-lived however, as a confluence of events came together 
to change the future of Space Station Freedom. 
 In 1990, the space station was found to be too heavy and too complicated to 
construct.51 With it costing more and more money and the budget for the space station 
continually underestimated by NASA, the program became dangerously close to being 
cut altogether by the Congress.  The Congress would hold a vote in 1993 on whether to 
continue the program- it came within one vote of being shut down.52  Thus NASA was 
forced to come up with an incredibly scaled down project that eliminated many of the 
science aspects of the original space station that still cost more than what was expected. 
At the same time, the former Soviet Union was falling apart and concerns began 
to be raised about their space program and their scientists.  With no guarantee of income 
or a job, there was a danger that these scientists would go on to work with groups or 
countries and give them valuable knowledge concerning nuclear weapons.  As a result, 
the US invited Russia to become a major partner in the International Space Station (ISS) 
thus ensuring their scientists jobs and their economy money.  The space station that had 
originally begun as a counter to the Soviet Union’s Mir now had the cooperation of 
Russia with much of the original rationale for the space station disappearing.   
Performance 
 Once again, NASA’s performance has come into question not because of failing 
to reach performance objectives but because of what they did to get approval for their 
projects.  Some may proclaim NASA has literally lied to not only the president but also 
the Congress in order to get the space station approved, but perhaps it was more of a 
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question of good intentions with bad results.  NASA personnel may have truly believed 
that the space station could be designed and constructed with a relatively small budget 
and that it would eventually turn a profit, but the experience with the space shuttle should 
have been a lesson.  Technology does not often grow at the pace that other people want it 
to grow at and, as had been learned with other government acquisition projects, as stated 
before, the budgets are often higher than projected. 
 Certainly, the budget that was continually lowered by the Congress for the space 
station project played a role in the constant redesigns that consequently cost more.  On 
the other hand, however, if NASA had given an estimate that was higher for the space 
station that could have been closer to the actual cost, the program might never have 
gotten off the ground.  To NASA’s credit, it was between a rock and the rest of the 
government; NASA needed to give the space shuttle something else to do and wanted to 
continue its presence in space.  Human spaceflight was what brought the largest 
percentage of money into the agency and by continually flying humans into space, NASA 
could guarantee itself a certain amount of money every year.  Beside the conscious 
decision to remain in low-Earth orbit with the space shuttle and the space station, some 
within NASA thought that the space station could serve as a middle ground between 
Earth and the rest of our solar system- it would eventually turn into a jumping off point 
for missions to Mars.  But good intentions often have bad outcomes as the space station 
and the space shuttle have shown. 
 That NASA did not learn from its mistakes is an example of two characteristics of 
NASA:  it is hardheaded, determined to get its own way, it pursues a specific vision of its 
own, and is willing to use its power, but also that the agency strove to continue a human 
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presence in space and follow the ideal of continuing discoveries and journeys into space.  
It is this “real” and “ideal” NASA that many have often commented about, including 
renowned physicist Freeman Dyson.53  The ideal NASA still holds on to the dreams of 
moving further and further out into space but the real NASA is still destined to remain in 
low-Earth orbit because of its emphasis on survival and greater budgets.  The tension 
between these two ideals remains and perhaps a winning side will never be decided upon. 
Intragovernmental Relations 
 There are two highlights of NASA’s intergovernmental relations during this 
period:  getting presidential approval for the space station program and increasing 
congressional oversight over the program.  In the course of persuading Reagan to approve 
the space station, NASA utilized a number of reasons including:  commercial 
applications, the Cold War, and that it was the next logical step.  When NASA referred to 
the space station as the next logical step, they were really saying that now that we have a 
space shuttle, it needs to do something (build a space station) and that that space station 
would serve as a way station for further exploration.  Reagan, being perhaps the 
consummate Cold Warrior, accepted these rationales and NASA explanations and 
approved the program in 1984.   
 That NASA could convince Reagan to support the program using almost the same 
rationales as they used for the space shuttle program is intriguing.  Obviously NASA 
claims that the shuttle could be cost-efficient, reliable, and provide routine access into 
space were coming to naught at that time.  How could Reagan trust NASA with another 
multi-billion dollar program that it claimed would be economical and provide constant 
US access in space?  This event provides an unmistakable indication of the amount of 
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power that NASA still wielded even though the space shuttle program was 
underperforming compared to its stated objectives. 
 But not all in government were convinced by NASA’s claims for the space 
station.  Just as we saw in the late 1970s, the number of General Accounting Office 
(GAO) reports concerning NASA increased from just two in 1986 to 38 in 1992 at the 
height of the discussions concerning the space station.  Congress was certainly utilizing 
their oversight powers and not just in investigating the agency either.  A number of votes 
were held in the early 1990s concerning the future of the program with the closest the 
program came to being killed being one vote. The amount of oversight that Congress 
took with the space station, however, Greenberg finds to be the norm- the program was 
constantly criticized and chastised yet still survived.54
The 1990s:  A Reemergence of Space, a Reemergence of NASA 
 While the events of the 1960s did not truly play themselves out all over again in 
the 1990s, the memories were brought back out in the form of popular culture. The 1990s 
became the first decade since the existence of NASA that brought no new major human 
spaceflight program.  Instead, the International Space Station finally got off the ground 
and the space shuttle inched closer to achieving its goal of at least, reliable access to 
space.   
 The 1990s began with the replacement shuttle Endeavour coming into service 
following the Challenger disaster.  Endeavour was approved in 1987 as a replacement for 
the lost orbiter and was built at a cost of over $2 billion dollars.  Marking the end of a 
long recovery period from NASA’s first loss of a crew during an actual mission, 
Endeavour flew its first flight in 1992. 
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 Another significant characteristic of the decade for NASA was the long and stable 
leadership of Dan Goldin as administrator of NASA.  Pioneering the “faster, better, 
cheaper” trend that had been evident for some time now, Goldin made extensive 
personnel cuts, reduced the time spent designing new science missions, and lowered 
budget estimates submitted to the Congress.55 Goldin serveed as NASA administrator 
through a total of three presidential administrations, from 1992-2001. 
 It was not only stable leadership, the space shuttle program’s recovery from 
Challenger, and the headway made with the International Space Station that led to a 
greater awareness of NASA and its programs during the 1990s.  Nor was it a big 
presidential announcement of a new space program.  The release of the film “Apollo 13” 
in 1995 and the HBO miniseries “From the Earth to the Moon” in 1998 marked a new 
interest in the space program.  In his study of public opinion and NASA, Launius found 
that “These images from popular culture, coupled with real world accomplishments in 
spaceflight, work together to create powerful visions affecting the public 
consciousness.”56  Launius found that until 1995, public opinion polls concluded that a 
majority of the American public favored robotic space exploration over human 
exploration of space.57  He traces the change to not only the ensuing Mir/Shuttle 
missions, but to the release of “Apollo 13” and other “near-term science fiction films.”58
 Along with the film “Apollo 13,” two other movies released in the 1990s served 
to reignite public interest in the space program:  “Armageddon” and “Deep Impact,” both 
released in 1998.  “Armageddon,” a film in which a fictitious asteroid is on a collision 
course with Earth is notable for the significant involvement of NASA both in real life and 
in the movie.  In the movie, NASA is clearly portrayed throughout as the agency that 
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spearheads the effort to blow the asteroid up so that it does not hit the Earth.  NASA 
provides a new class of shuttle for the mission and trains the crews for the mission; Billy 
Bob Thornton plays a NASA mission manager with a critical role on Earth during the 
mission.  NASA also participated in the filming of the movie with giving technical advice 
(though the film is still technically inaccurate). 
 “Deep Impact” does not have the focus on NASA that “Armageddon” has.  The 
film’s subplot involves a crew sent to the comet that is due to hit the Earth, but the major 
plotlines have more to do with the effects on individual people on Earth knowing that a 
comet is on its way to destroy their home and possibly their lives.  The combination of 
these two movies, however, served to stimulate an interest in Near Earth Objects (NEOs) 
that could possibly collide with the Earth and NASA’s efforts to stop them.  While 
NASA does have an NEO program, it has recently been decried as utterly under funded. 
 Real life events also helped to heighten public interest in the program.  On July 4, 
1997, the first successful Mars rover landed on the red planet and beamed pictures back 
to Earth.  Taking place on America’s Independence Day, Sojourner was released by the 
Mars Pathfinder and provided stunning pictures of Mars that had never been seen before.  
Following the success of Sojourner, two more rovers would be sent to Mars in 2003 that 
would be equally successful.  With the combination of sometimes fantastic and 
sometimes partially truthful docudramas and the successful Mars missions, the percent of 
people who believed NASA’s performance to be either excellent or good rose from 46% 
in July 1990 to a decade high of 76% in November 1998.59
 But successes notwithstanding, NASA’s scientific exploration of Mars would 
indeed suffer from some very public disasters.  The Mars Climate Orbiter was destroyed 
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as it attempted to enter into orbit around Mars in 1998.  The orbiter suffered its fatal error 
because of a measurement mix-up by contractor Lockheed Martin.  Coming closely on 
the heels of the successful Sojourner mission, most had expected this mission to be 
equally successful; with such high hopes for success, its failure was all the more 
deafening. 
 Aside from the science mission failures, the human spaceflight program seemed 
to have gotten its pitfalls behind them.  After years of delays on the part of both America 
and Russia, the first module of the ISS was placed into orbit in 1998.  Following the 
addition of two more modules, the beginning of a continual human presence on the ISS 
began in 2000.  Giving the Russians “a steady paycheck” for their involvement in the ISS 
also seemed to be helping the recovering Russia.60  Yet at the same time, some within 
NASA were concerned with Russia’s continuing operations on the space station Mir.61  
Russia’s attempt at creating modules for the ISS and continuing operations on Mir was 
delaying the ISS and continually infuriating America and the other partners in the project.  
As a result, NASA pressured the Russians to deorbit Mir so that they could focus on the 
ISS.  A very political decision indeed, some wondered whether NASA felt that its ISS 
was threatened by having another space station nearby already.  Why spend all this 
money on designing, building, and constructing in orbit a brand new space station when 
one was already there?  Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, routine human spaceflight 
seemed all the more reliable and had a purpose- construct the International Space Station. 
Performance 
 Of all the time periods examined here, it could be argued that during the 1990s, 
NASA’s performance increased greatly.  With no major mishaps or deaths and no new 
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scandals over under priced programs, NASA seemed to be well on its way to “faster, 
better, cheaper.”  Indeed, the number of reports concerning NASA during the 1990s 
continually dropped throughout the decade to a low of seven in 1998.  Public opinion was 
warming back up to the program and many thought that the worst was behind them. 
 But all is never as well as it initially appears and the same is true of NASA.  
During the 1990s, NASA attempted developing several vehicles that eventually replaced 
the space shuttle yet none of these programs ever came to fruition.  The GAO 
acknowledged this saying that “Despite many successes in the exploration of space, such 
as landing the Pathfinder and Exploration Rovers on Mars, NASA has had difficulty 
bringing a number of projects to completion, including several efforts to build a second 
generation reusable human spaceflight vehicle to replace the space shuttle.”62  Part of the 
problem with these programs is that, outside of the International Space Station, the future 
goals and requirements for US human spaceflight was unknown and had never really 
been debated; thus, it was unclear ”what kind of ‘post-Shuttle’ vehicle to develop.”63  
While not a failure of a major program, the failure of NASA to be able to develop the 
next generation of space transportation system after the shuttle had been in operation 
almost twenty years could be considered a failure of planning.   
Intragovernmental Relations 
 With no new human spaceflight program during the 1990s, then-President Bill 
Clinton really had very little interaction with the space agency.  In contrast, however, 
relations with the Congress were improving.  Dan Goldin’s focus on cutting the budget 
and streamlining the agency and imposed congressional budget ceilings on the 
International Space Station helped to keep budget costs for the space station under 
 76
control.  And with no one under any illusion that the space shuttle would be economical, 
budget quarrels over that program were few and far between.  NASA even played a 
critical foreign policy role following the break-up of the Soviet Union, giving the 
Russians funding and something to do.  As mentioned previously, the number of reports 
concerning the space program generated by the GAO consistently fell throughout the 
decade and increased public interest in the agency helped to alleviate support problems in 
the Congress. 
 While the number of GAO reports on NASA did indeed decrease, the GAO’s 
criticism of the agency did not.  Beginning in 1990, the GAO “identified NASA’s 
contract management as a high-risk area.”64  NASA’s cost-estimating procedures, though 
a problem since the 1970s, became a major problem for them in the 1990s.  The GAO 
derided NASA not only for terrible cost-estimates but also for the bad program 
management that stemmed from that.   
Columbia 
 The progress that NASA made through the 1990s with respect to the space shuttle 
and International Space Station programs was not destined to last into the new 
millennium.  On February 1, 2003, returning from a two-week flight to the International 
Space Station, disintegrated over Texas upon reentry.  The eventual technical fault was 
found to be a foam strike on the left wing during lift-off from the Kennedy Space Center 
in Florida.  While some within NASA were concerned about possible damage from the 
debris strike, the concerns were eventually waved off. 
 Similar to the aftermath of Challenger, the accident put the shuttle fleet on an 
immediate grounding and sent the space agency scrambling to find the cause.  And just 
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like Challenger, many of the causes would be found within NASA itself.  The Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, or CAIB, was the counterpart to the Rogers Commission 
for Columbia.  It found that, in addition to the technical flaws and “In response to White 
House and Congressional mandates, NASA leaders took actions that created systematic 
organizational flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for Columbia.”65    
 For many, these “flaws” are questions of culture, or rather NASA’s way of 
operating.  The same questions that arose following Challenger crept up in Columbia’s 
wake.  Over 15 years had passed between the two accidents, yet NASA was still pushing 
a tight schedule of launches due to the construction of the ISS.  Following years of 
delays, progress was finally being consistently made on getting the ISS into orbit and 
constructed.  As a result, the shuttle launch schedule was pushed to its breaking point.  
The GAO noted that “Columbia’s safety was compromised in part by the shuttle 
program’s fluctuating priorities and arbitrary schedule pressures to achieve certain space 
station milestones.”66  This comment is noteworthy since the fact that the shuttle launch 
schedule was deemed to be “arbitrary” reinforces the blame that should be placed on 
NASA.  In 1986, NASA was pushing the shuttle in order to demonstrate that it achieved 
the cost efficiency benefits that had been proclaimed yet since then, those claims have 
been proven wholly false.  Therefore, in 2003, the shuttle schedule was completely 
arbitrary; knowing that it would never be cost-effective, NASA personnel could have 
taken the time to ensure safety and a reliable orbiter yet they were continually be pushed 
to get the space station constructed to the point of neglecting the possibility of increased 
safety in the form of a shuttle replacement. 
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 Similar to the Rogers Commission’s finding of blame in NASA’s culture, the 
CAIB found that “NASA’s culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of 
command, procedure, following the rules, and going by the book.  While rules and 
procedures were essential for coordination, they had an unintended negative effect.  
Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replace deference to NASA engineers’ 
technical expertise.”67  This very familiar conclusion leads to an eerie train of thought- 
had the lessons concerning culture and safety been fully implemented following 
Challenger, could Columbia have been avoided?  Perhaps time had eroded the value of 
the lessons; as we get further and further away from 1986, people get more and more 
confident in those same systems and procedures.  Lessons get lost, memories become 
fuzzy, and accidents happen. 
 Columbia not only led to questions of culture but also to the topic of the aging 
shuttles.  While various programs, most notably the DC-X and X-33 programs, had been 
trying to develop replacements for the space shuttle, most went over budget and/or were 
cancelled for various reasons.  The promising X-33 program was cancelled in 2001 in 
deference to the new Space Launch Initiative, which would in turn be cancelled just prior 
to Columbia.68  Questions concerning what to do with the shuttle had lingered for years; 
by 2000, the technology was already almost 25 years old.  But the same question that was 
not asked following Apollo was still not being asked at the beginning of the 21st century- 
what does America want out of its space program?  Without answers to that very 
fundamental questions, appropriate programs cannot be designed and pursued.  Again, 
CAIB found this question to be very elemental- without answers as to what the nation 
wants, NASA is not funded properly and thus strives “to do too much with too little.”69
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 These familiar echoes of Challenger turned into deafening roars following 
Columbia.  And like the aftermath in 1986, the push to continue exploration of space had 
been heard from not only the president, but the congress as well.  That NASA had a 
future was all but written in stone, but what would that future hold? 
Performance 
 Clearly, Columbia was not NASA’s best moment.  While the criticisms levied 
following Challenger were quite direct and alarming, that NASA allowed the same 
problems to creep up once again is inexcusable.  Ultimately, the crew of Columbia died 
not of first mistakes, but of second, third, and fourth ones.  However, in NASA’s defense, 
the same technical mishap, falling foam from the shuttle’s external tank, that doomed 
Columbia was an event that had been seen in prior shuttle launches with no ill effect.  
With history showing that the orbiter could sustain hits from this foam, it could be argued 
that nothing out of the ordinary be feared.   
 Yet there is evidence, provided very extensively in the report of the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, that concerns about the falling foam were particularly 
more virulent following the launch of this particular flight.  Because the size of the foam 
and the speed it was traveling at were so great, a number of engineers were concerned.  
When the problem was taken up the chain of command, however, it was quickly stifled 
and offers from the military to get high resolution images of the orbiter were declined.  
True, had the foam strike been found to be deadly while the crew was still in orbit, there 
was probably very little they could do to fix their spacecraft.  The possibilities and their 
consequences are far too varied to be considered here, but it is safe to say that the saying 
“better safe than sorry” was not listened to. 
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 What is commendable on NASA’s part was their reaction to Columbia in 
comparison to Challenger.  Following the accident in 1986, many had criticized NASA 
of withholding information and not being completely forthright with the country and 
investigators.  That mistake was not made again in 2003; NASA immediately endorsed 
the appointment of an independent board and made itself available for all inquiries.   
Intragovernmental Relations 
 Following Columbia, NASA as an organization, as noted above, was more 
forthcoming about its actions to the media and to the rest of the government.  The 
accident indeed brought new attention to NASA and the nation’s space policy.  Questions 
of the need for a new program or a new orbiter arose.  And while a few calls for the 
abandonment of NASA altogether were heard, there were not nearly as many as in 1986.   
The Future:  Project Constellation 
Nearly one year after the destruction of Columbia, President George W. Bush 
announced a new plan for NASA, the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE).  The VSE 
provides for the retirement of the space shuttle by 2010, the development of a new 
human-rated space vehicle, the Crew Exploration Vehicle, and a return to the moon by 
2020.  The plan also provides for the development of a new lifter, the Ares, with enough 
power to propel the CEV out of Earth orbit.  The Ares would be the first new class of 
heavy lifter since the Saturn V of the Apollo era. 
 The crux of this new project, which would generally require large influxes of new 
money into the NASA budget, is the retirement of the space shuttle, which would free up 
the requisite money.  But there are still questions regarding the “long-term funding 
outlook”:  the GAO found that “the agency [NASA] will have to keep the program 
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compelling for both Congress and potential international partners, in terms of the 
activities that will be conducted as part of the lunar program, in order for the program to 
be sustainable in the long run.”70  Thus, NASA will continue to find itself in the same 
position of the past three decades, that is, continually justifying a program that costs 
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars, with perhaps little of valuable scientific 
returns guaranteed.   
 Since this section concerns the future of NASA programs, I will not examine 
issues regarding intergovernmental relations and performance as above. Instead, I will 
look at some of the lessons that NASA has, hopefully, learned from, and how it may 
apply to Project Constellation.  These questions include:  cost-estimating and budget 
processes, bureaucracy versus technology, and questions of what a proper space policy 
for the United States would look like and consist of. 
 One of the biggest problems with both the space shuttle and space station 
programs was the ill-informed cost-estimation and budget processes.  These low-cost 
estimates and claims of economy eventually lead to unreasonable expectations, which in 
turn were not met.  Combined with this, when the will is not in the Congress to continue 
funding projects like this at the level which is required, budgets get cut and capabilities 
are then cut from the program.  In sum, the combination of these two problems lead to a 
snowball effect; low cost-estimates lead to unreasonable expectation of economy, 
capabilities get cut, the Congress cuts funds, and even more capabilities are gone.  What 
is left, then, is a program like the space shuttle, which does not live up to its original 
expectations in the least.   
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 The lesson that NASA should draw from this is that the theory of low cost-
estimates garners support in the Congress hardly ever proves right.  The best course of 
action would be to completely open with the Congress and the country as to the level of 
monetary support that is going to be required for a project such as Constellation.  If the 
executive and legislative programs still support it after a full evaluation of the costs 
involved, then there is a greater chance that it will be funded adequately.  Yet even this 
does not always prove true.  In the current appropriations cycle, NASA’s budget is 
projected to be cut; that cut in turn could lead to serious consequences for Constellation, 
perhaps similar to what has been seen with the shuttle and the International Space 
Station.  So what does NASA do when its stuck between a rock and a hard place?   
 Among the many rocks that NASA is caught between are also rocks named 
bureaucracy and technology.  Both the Rogers Commission following Challenger and the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board found that contributing causes to the respective 
accidents included the tendency for bureaucrats to prevail over technocrats.  In other 
words, the assumption that the bureaucratic channels, procedures, and hierarchies would 
catch any significant problems influenced those in the agency to ignore falling foam or 
destructive o-rings.   
 This bureaucratic tendency also led to a push for launches; in Challenger’s case, it 
was a push to get more shuttles up in less time and in Columbia’s case (while the shuttle 
Columbia itself did not go to the ISS), it was a push to get the International Space Station 
constructed and completed.  While Project Constellation may not experience the same 
kinds of pressures as the space shuttle has, it certainly will experience some.  With 
retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, there is a projected four year gap in American 
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human spaceflight capability- the CEV, Orion, is not scheduled to be online until 2014.  
Thus, Project Constellation will face pressures to get Orion developed and built as 
quickly as possible to keep the gap between it and the shuttle small.  Where a gap 
between vehicles might have been acceptable in the past, one program in particular 
makes it quite unsavory now:  the International Space Station.  With American needs for 
personnel and supplies on the ISS and no space shuttle to get them there, the US will 
have to depend on Russia for flights to and from the ISS.71   
 Dependence on Russia leads to the third problem that NASA and the rest of the 
government will have in developing Project Constellation, what is the proper role of 
space policy in American society.  That this question has never been truly thought though 
should be apparent by now; the desires of NASA to continue human spaceflight at the 
level it is used to have never been properly reconciled to the requirements of greater US 
policy.   
Conclusion 
 NASA has endured almost 50 years of a long and winding existence during which 
NASA has been fearful, to say the least, of losing budgetary and monetary footing.  Its 
performance has suffered and rebounded, it has seen new programs come and go, and has 
pushed it own agenda to much success.  The question that we are left with is thus, if 
NASA has suffered so many defeats and pitfalls, why does it continue to have the support 
of the rest of the government in bestowing new multi-billion dollar programs?  If NASA 
was really doing that badly, would they continue to get the funds that they do?  Is there 
some kind of cycle waiting to be discovered here?  These questions will continue to be 
examined and probed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4:  GOVERNMENT AGENCY DECLINE MODEL WITH 
NASA AS A CASE STUDY 
 
A Model of Governmental Agency Decline 
 
If decline as presented in the literature is not applicable to the government, then what 
is?  The main argument presented here is that in government, there is no such thing as 
decline.  Rather, agencies and organizations are constantly in flux, or rather, their 
operations change according to political and fiscal resources, which in turn depend on 
overall economic performance (Figure 4-1).  Thus, the three major indicators to be 
examined are money, performance, and power. 
 
 
 
Figure 0-1:  Governmental Agency Decline 
 In this chapter, I will present this model and its component parts.  It must be kept 
in mind, however, that this is simply a model for analysis of government agencies.  The 
variables that are established for a study of NASA may not necessarily be the same that 
could be established for the Department of State or FEMA.  It is not possible to specify 
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generalized performance targets for all agencies as they each perform different activities 
and fulfill different duties.  
 One other constraint to this model is that it does not cover the initial stages of an 
agency.  As predicted by Downs’s life cycle theory, new agencies often undergo rapid 
development and expansion and as such must mesh the different cultures of previous 
organizations so that the new one can develop.  These new agencies also have an 
enormous amount of political support that has supported their creation in the first place 
and as such, their power and ability to get money and resources are likely dramatically 
out of sync with their future budgets.  NASA can even be seen as an example of this in 
what is often called the Apollo paradigm or the Apollo legacy.  In its first decade in 
existence, NASA was provided with an abundance of funds and support; the argument 
whether this was because it was a new agency or because of Cold War political realities 
do not really matter here.  The point is, what NASA experienced in its first decade 
became much different than what it experienced in the 35 years since.   
 I will examine each of the three indicators in turn and then put forth the specific 
variables I will be using in regards to NASA. 
Budget 
 Greenberg puts it succinctly “the politics of science is registered in money 
awarded or denied.”1  The hinge of this model and the point at which it can begin or be 
interrupted is money.  Money is the ultimate resource that allows an agency to perform its 
tasks.  Without adequate funding, some things may not get done, some things may not get 
done well, or people are laid off.  Generally though, the agency is expected to continue its 
tasks at the same level (or better), just with less resources and funding.   
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 The budgeting process is the method through which agencies request funds, get 
funds approved, and then receive and spend them.  It is not the agency or organization 
itself that decides how much an organization should get, any number of people and 
organizations influence the budget process through the executive branch to the 
legislative.  This political process, then, as identified by Wildavsky and others, impacts 
the amounts of money that a given organization will receive.  Of course, this is not the 
only restraint in the budgeting process- environmental factors certainly affect political 
calculations.  For example, the current budget deficit or the amount of taxes received (and 
thus the amount of money that the legislature has to work with) can all affect the budget.  
Natural disasters and defense needs can also play a role.   
 The differences between agencies funded through discretionary funds and 
mandatory outlays also play a major role.  Hence, we must distinguish between 
discretionary and mandatory.  Mandatory outlays include those monies, which are 
required by law or statute to be spent each and every year regardless of political, 
economic, or environmental factors.  Items like Social Security, Medicare, other 
entitlement programs, and interest owed on debts are included in this category, which, in 
2006 took up 62% of the entire US budget.2  Because these outlays are considered 
mandatory, only so much of the rest of the budget is left to fund not only other 
government agencies, but also the Department of Defense and the military. 
 It must be noted that the defense budget comes from the discretionary part of the 
budget. In 2005, the defense budget made up 51% of the discretionary budget, therefore, 
what was already limited, becomes limited even further.3  Because of the nature of the 
military and the need for them to be prepared for possible conflicts and to fight in current 
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ones, the military budget is often what is required by the Defense Department, and not 
what is appropriated by the Congress.  Some within the Congress may feel as if, 
politically, their only choice is to fully fund the military so as to protect the US.  
Therefore, although the military budget comes from the discretionary pot, oftentimes, it is 
not discretionary in the least. 
 The source of NASA’s budget are these discretionary funds.  Perhaps Caspar 
Weinberger, as an aide to Nixon represented NASA’s situation best when he wrote in a 
memo to Nixon: “The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA 
is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable.  In short we cut it because it is 
cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary one.”4  The point of this 
discussion then, is the importance of recognizing not only the amount of the funding, but 
the source.  NASA’s funding must be examined with an eye towards discretionary 
funding; it cannot be compared to programs that are legislatively required to be funded.   
 In order to examine this money aspect of the model, one must first look at the 
actual budget levels of the agency.  However, this is not the only exercise that could be or 
should be done.  Comparing the budgets of one agency to others will help to gain an 
overall picture of what funding situation was present in any given year.  Did a number of 
agencies lose funding, was it just a handful, or only one?  If NASA was the only agency 
to gain or lose funding, then we have just learned something else.  But again, the 
discretionary nature of the budget must be taken into account and comparisons cannot be 
made across agencies not within the discretionary arena. 
 A number of exercises can be done regarding the NASA budget and the entire US 
budget, specifically encompassing comparisons that can enlighten us as to NASA’s 
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stance in regards to the rest of the government.  While the percent of the total budget that 
is directed towards NASA is generally very tiny, we can look not only at that figure, but 
also NASA’s percent of the discretionary pie. 
 A large part of the comparison however, will encompass comparisons between 
NASA’s budgets and the budgets of other agencies.  Taking into account the 
discretionary source and the types of tasks that the agencies perform, I have chosen two 
agencies to compare NASA against:  the National Science Foundation and the National 
Institutes of Health.  Both of these agencies participate in research (and development 
activities in the case of the NIH), which make them appropriate foils against which to 
compare NASA.  It is possible to track, over time, the percent of the total US budget and 
the discretionary budget each of these agencies received and compare NASA to them.   
Performance 
 Within the performance aspect it is not possible to simply construct certain 
performance standards for NASA or any other government agency and apply them to 
projects that were not designed to be measured against these ad hoc standards. Not even 
within the traditional decline literature itself, do we find constructed measures of 
performance.5  Therefore these measures must be individually constructed for each 
agency that is to be studied.  
 The emphasis on performance in the government has not always existed.  In 1993, 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted which required 
yearly performance reports from federal agencies.6  These reports, though, were not 
required until 1997.7   Additionally, scholars have found these reports to be “works in 
progress” and Beryl has described the requirements as a “tangled set of expectations.”8  
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Criticism of the act has also come in the shape of one of the restrictions within this 
model.  Implementing a government wide system of accountability is admirable, but can 
it truly be done?  Is it fair to apply the same standards to agencies that perform widely 
varying functions?    
 Because the GPRA has only been in use for ten years, it does not give much 
information concerning NASA for the bulk of the period being studied.  Performance 
reports put out by the agency in question must also be critically examined; since these 
reports influence thinking concerning the agency, they are more likely to be less critical 
of the agency in question.  While painting the situation in a good light benefits the 
agency, it does not benefit the scholar studying the agency.  As such, judgment 
concerning the use of GPRA reports and other performance reports published by 
government agencies must be left to the scholar utilizing the model to study a particular 
agency. 
The challenge within performance thus becomes creating indicators of 
performance that do not unfairly measure programs against standards which they were 
not designed to live up to.  These standards must be created for each agency being 
evaluated within this model and cannot simply be put forth here. 
NASA not only deals with human spaceflight but also with science missions.  It 
would be wrong to weigh both of these types of missions similarly; when NASA 
launches a rocket with a satellite or science mission onboard, human life is usually not 
risked.  But when the space shuttle lifts off with up to seven people onboard, the danger 
and the standards for avoiding disasters are much higher.  Therefore, when considering 
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performance, human missions will be separated out from robotic and/or scientific 
launches. 
The total number of launches including human, science, and missions which 
NASA has solely provided launch services is a base statistic that will be used in this 
analysis.  The number of successful launches (as designated by NASA) is tracked through 
which the success rate of launches in any given year is calculated.  Further, the number of 
science missions launched in a year will be used to examine performance.  For the human 
spaceflight program, the number of human flights per year will be utilized.  From data 
provided by the archive of shuttle missions published on NASA’s Kennedy Space Center 
website, I have calculated the number of delay days per year that the space shuttles have 
experienced.  This figure is calculated from the date of the original planned launch and 
when the launch actually occurred.  The statistic, however, that will be primarily used is 
the percent of on-time human flights per year. 
 As has been noted before and used previously, reports generated by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide a political measure of indicating 
NASA’s performance.  Since these reports are written usually on the request of a 
legislator, the number gives a clue as to the amount of oversight that NASA could be 
experiencing.  Increased oversight is most likely to come when agencies are experiencing 
times of trouble or low performance.  Further, the criticisms found in these reports are 
often directed towards NASA operations and help to inform the analysis. 
Power 
 Power is an inherently difficult concept to define and measure.  White contends 
that “Power is not a physical thing;” if power is not something physical, it may be seen as 
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completely unquantifiable.9  Part of the problem of power is conceptualization; what 
exactly we are defining, what a definition of power should include, and what this 
conceptualization should clarify are all bones of contention.10  Pluralist theories of power 
such as those presented by Robert Dahl contend that power is seen only through the 
actions that cause something to happen.  More specifically, power is exercised when 
person A does some action B to cause another person C to act like A wants them to.  
There are problems with this conception, however.  Any person can act and thus create an 
observable action- it is the result of that action that shows power or influence.  Therefore, 
we may be able to see a form of power in the resulting action but person A can have 
power even if he or she does nothing with it.  
 It is not so much the question of whether NASA has power, by virtue of being a 
government agency we can say that it does, but how much of it do they have and how 
they exercise it.  So what does power mean with respect to NASA?  Ball writes that the 
concept of power is likely to be ambiguous separate from its context therefore “Its 
meaning is its use, the ways in which it is used.”11  With respect to NASA, its place in 
government, and its missions, NASA’s exercise of power within government is its ability 
to get what the agency wants or to persuade others to go along with NASA’s wishes.  In 
order to guide my examination of NASA’s power, I will employ the following 
conceptualization of power:  the ability to persuade, convince, or influence person or 
agency C to do what person or agency A wants them to do.  While some, such as James 
Webb, believed that “it was up to the government to tell NASA what to do,” what we 
have seen throughout the history of NASA is their pursuit of what they deem to be the 
most necessary for survival reasons or otherwise.12   
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 An example of this exercise of power of persuasion comes following the 
introduction of the space shuttle in 1981.  NASA needed something to do with the shuttle 
and the justification for having it was thus found in a space station.13  In order to get 
approval for a space station, NASA officials needed to convince the Reagan 
administration of the usefulness of such a project.  Klerkx writes that “had NASA not 
convinced Reagan that industrial suitors interested in lucrative microgravity research and 
manufacturing could eventually turn the station into a for-profit enterprise, it probably 
wouldn’t have been built.”14  This has obviously not occurred with the operation of either 
the space shuttle or the International Space Station but can be seen as an example of 
NASA pursuing (and getting) what it wants- thus using power.   
 A number of ways to measure power must be considered here.  As has been 
argued before in chapter three, public opinion may influence representatives and their 
actions with the logic being that if the public supports program, than their representatives 
should support it to.  But as Jacobs, Lawrence, Shapiro and Smith found, the influence of 
public opinion to be weak and lower than originally thought mostly because of the 
methodological questions surrounding polling.15   
Additionally, the only consistent measure of public opinion regarding NASA is 
provided by the General Social Survey approximately every two years in their question: 
“Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the space exploration 
program?”16  Asking whether the amount of money we are spending on space exploration 
does not equate very well to how much power NASA holds with the general public; 
rather, this seems to be a better expression of how the public believes the agency is 
performing.   
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 Recognizing the limits to conceptualizations of power and thus how to measure it, 
the qualitative analysis presented in chapter two and expanded upon below will provide 
greater context to the question of power.  From this qualitative analysis, I aim to identify 
points in time where NASA has held more or less power as seen by its actions and their 
outcomes. 
NASA as a Case Study 
The work laid out here and in the previous chapters has lent itself well to a 
continuing analysis using quantitative methods.  As such, in testing the model, I will treat 
it as four separate hypotheses:  one, US economic performance affects NASA’s budget; 
two, NASA’s budget affects its performance; three, NASA’s performance enhances its 
power; and four, NASA’s power enhances its budgetary gains. 
Hypothesis One:  Economic Performance and Budgets 
 As a gauge of US economic performance, I have chosen to use the gross domestic 
product (GDP) over the 35-year period in question.  As such, my initial tests including 
examining for correlations among GDP, NASA’s budget (and the budget broken down 
into its scientific and human spaceflight components), the US discretionary budget, the 
total US budget, and the budgets of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH). 
 As demonstrated in Table A-1 (see Appendix One for all data tables referred to in 
this chapter), all of the relationships are significant.  What is the most interesting to note, 
however, is that the correlation with the lowest Pearson value (besides the correlation 
associated with the subdivision of NASA’s budget) is GDP and NASA’s total budget.  
This suggests that there is something other than the influence of national economic 
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performance involved in the relationship.  This fits well with the government agency 
decline model (GAD), which suggests that an agency’s power also influences its 
budgetary gains.  That hypothesis is tested further down. 
 An additional component of the model suggests that a time lag should be present; 
in other words, the GDP in one year more strongly affects the budget in a later year.  I 
have hypothesized that there is a two to three year time lag present within the model but I 
have tested for time lags of one to five years (table A-2).   
 Two items of importance should be noticed here.  One, while all the correlations 
remain significant, it becomes less important for NASA over time.  The same is true of 
the total and discretionary US budget, although these figures still remain higher than the 
NASA correlations.  Two, the Pearson figures for NSF and NIH grow over time.  This 
suggests that these budgets are continually growing over time whether due to GDP or 
other factors.  One explanation could be that the importance of these agencies has grown 
over time and thus, so have their budgets.  What is important to the analysis here, is that 
of NSF and NIH as comparisons to NASA are quite appropriate as they act as baselines 
from which to examine the rise and fall in NASA’s budget. 
 In order to extend the analysis, I also performed a regression analysis testing the 
relationship between GDP and the various budget variables.  Table A-3 confirms the 
findings of table A-1; the relationships are all significant though the effect that GDP has 
on the different budgets varies.  Compared to the R-square of the total US Budget, the 
discretionary budget, and the budgets of NSF and NIH, GDP has the lowest effect on the 
NASA budget with an R-square of .877.  This continues to suggest that something else is 
at work in influencing the yearly budget that NASA receives.  
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 To further examine the effect of time of GDP’s relationship to budget, I used 
regression analyses with time effects for the total US budget, NASA’s budget, and the 
NSF and NIH budgets.  Table A- 4 presents the effect that time has on the relationship 
between GDP and the total US budget.  One should note the R-square values decrease 
over three years very slightly and then rise by a small degree in the last two years.  
Comparatively, the R-square values in table A-5 for GDP and NASA over time actually 
decrease from .876 in an analysis with a one-year time lag to .840 in an analysis with a 
five-year time lag.  This is simply more evidence for there being another variable 
influencing NASA’s budget. 
The only regression that does not produce significant relationships is that of the 
NSF budget over time, though the R-square value does increase over the five years.  The 
only value that fails to show significance is that of the constant; the beta value for the 
independent is significant.  Since the analysis of the NIH budget in table A-7 shows 
significance for all values in all five years, it may be possible to conclude that this result 
is spurious.  The correlation values over time are similar and the R-squares increase for 
NSF and NIH over time as well, contributing to the conclusion that it is indeed spurious. 
Hypothesis Two:  Budgets and Performance 
 The next step in the analysis is to examine the effects that budgets have on an 
agency’s performance.  It is hypothesized that as budgets rise, so will performance.  
Because NASA’s performance is predicated mostly on two major programs, the human 
spaceflight and science programs, these factors will be examined both together and 
separate.  Like the previous hypothesis, I have begun the examination with a look at the 
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correlations between the NASA budget and the various performance variables (table A-
8). 
 It is interesting that there is a slight negative correlation between the NASA 
budget and total launches in a year.  This demonstrates that there may need to be time 
between the implementation of a budget and the number of total launches, as 
hypothesized by the time lag.  Further, there is a stronger correlation among budget and 
performance factors involving human spaceflight rather than science missions.  The vast 
majority of the agency’s resources are dedicated to human spaceflight, as shown in 
chapter three, and as such these results should be expected.  NASA has dedicated an 
overwhelming amount of effort into the human spaceflight program because it has 
historically been considered more important and shown to draw more funds. 
 The correlation is also significant between NASA budget and the number of GAO 
reports.  GAO reports may be a better overall indicator of NASA performance as they 
examine many facets of the agency.  Since the variables consisting of launch data focus 
merely on one small aspect of NASA’s performance, the correlation between budget and 
GAO reports should be considered a more valid indicator of performance. 
 Again, however, the effect of time must be considered.  Table A-9 reports the 
correlations between NASA budget and various performance variables with one, two, 
three, four, and five-year time lags.  With significant results shown in bold, one can see 
that the same pattern exhibited above, that of significant relationships between budget 
and human spaceflight performance indicators and GAO reports, continues with the time 
lags.  Though the effect becomes less pronounced through the years, this again shows that 
the most significant relationships to be found are within the GAO reports and human 
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spaceflight performance.  Another reason that could contribute to this could be the sheer 
visibility of the human spaceflight program.  While the various science missions and 
other launches are not as well publicized, when the space shuttle is launched, people 
know.  Since this part of the program is the most visible, it requires the most amount of 
money to be successful.  NASA would certainly not want to appear unsuccessful when it 
launches humans into space as it repeatedly puts human lives at risk.  
 Since the relationship between the NASA budget and human spaceflight 
performance has been shown to be fairly strong, it is only natural to look at the 
relationship between only the human spaceflight portion of NASA’s budget to 
performance.  Those correlations, with time effects, are shown in table A-10.  Once 
again, there is a rather strong relationship between the manned spaceflight budget and the 
number of human flights per year.  Though the relationship does decrease as the time lag 
increases, it still remains significant through a time lag of four years.   
 When the same approach is taken with the science budget to science mission 
performance, less stringent results are found.  The only significant correlation within 
table A-11 is that of the science budget to science missions with a time lag of one year 
(though it should be noted that it is on the very cusp of significance).  Once again and 
confirming the suspicions of many researchers, it appears as if the science portion of 
NASA is superfluous or secondary to the main goal of putting humans into space. 
 To continue the analysis, I performed regression analyses of the relationships that 
the above correlations found to be significant.  These analyses can be found in tables A-
12 through A-18.  Very few of the analyses show significant relationships; in most cases, 
only one of the beta coefficients exhibit it.  In fact, there are only two of the regression 
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equations that show significance for all variables, NASA budget and total launches in the 
same year and the science budget to science missions with a one-year time lag.  This 
again confirms the result in table A-11, in which science missions are affected the most 
by the science budget in the year before.  It is also evident in table A-18 that the R-square 
value increases with that one-year time effect to .151 from .057 with no time effect.  In 
other words, the science budget contributes approximately 15% to explaining the number 
of science missions in the following year.   
 Both the correlation and regression results deserve some scrutiny, however.  For 
most of the science missions that NASA pursues, years of planning, development, and 
construction are involved, with usually more than one year required.  Therefore, in this 
area above all others, one would expect the time effect to be more pronounced.  On the 
other hand, the number of years required for satellite production has been decreasing; the 
lead-time though for NASA science missions, has not yet decreased to the point that we 
should expect the results gotten here.   
Hypothesis Three:  Performance and Power 
 
 With few quantitative methods of measuring power, the researcher is generally 
led to examine the nature of power with qualitative analysis.  Since an extensive review 
of NASA’s history was examined in chapter three, I find no need to repeat it here.  
Rather, drawing from the analysis of that chapter, the aim here is to identify periods of 
time in which NASA wielded power, particularly the power of persuasion; since it is 
almost impossible to come to a solid conclusion as to whether one has power or not, the 
utilization of it implies that an agency had to have had power in order to use it.  
Following the rough outline of major programs and timelines used in chapter two, here I 
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will consider five possible points in time in which NASA could have utilized power:  the 
shuttle decision, the International Space Station, post-Challenger, the late 1990s, and 
post-Columbia. 
The Shuttle Decision 
 The decision to go ahead with the Space Transportation System (STS) in the 
1970s was not always ensured though continuation of the human spaceflight was all but.  
NASA Administrator James Fletcher argued to the White House that the US essentially 
needed to be in space and Nixon did not want to be the president who ended American 
human spaceflight.17  Thus the question becomes whether the space shuttle decision was 
NASA flexing its political power to get what it wanted (a big, brand new human 
spaceflight program) or political inertia that required the US to remain in space.   
 Considering that NASA’s creation was essentially the result of Cold War politics, 
as the Soviet Union continued to send humans into space and begin an incredibly 
successful series of space stations, an argument could be made that the US could simply 
not entertain the thought of ending human spaceflight.  On the other hand, with President 
Nixon in office and his pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, an argument could also 
be made that the US did not have to continue sending humans into space in order to 
compete with the Soviet Union.  In fact, the Apollo-Soyuz tests of the 1970s would be 
demonstrations of US-USSR cooperation in space, rather than competition.   
 Further considerations come in the form of the Vietnam War.  With more and 
more money being required for defense, NASA had already seen the last few flights of 
Apollo cut.  Partially the consequence of increasing demands for money in other spheres, 
this decision also came as a consequence of decreasing public support for the endeavor.  
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Now that NASA had gotten to the moon and completed Kennedy’s mission, why 
continue going back?  Considering all of these caveats, perhaps the decision to continue 
with the shuttle program was not so much a consequence of NASA’s power, but of 
political inertia mixed with some persuasion.  Nixon did not want to end the program but 
the public did not want to see a massive influx of funds into a new program.  NASA was 
this able to persuade Nixon that the shuttle would serve as the appropriate middle ground 
as a program that would not cost much and in the end be economically viable.   
The International Space Station 
 Following a decade of shuttle development that consistently ran over costs and 
provided a set of orbiters that did not live up to expectations, NASA set out to gain 
presidential approval for Space Station Freedom from Ronald Reagan.  Billed as the next 
logical step, NASA wanted to pursue a space station project to give the space shuttle 
something to do.18  In order to convince an economically minded Reagan that the space 
station would be a project worth pursuing, NASA pushed the economic possibilities of 
the space station, particularly science and manufacturing prospects in low gravity.   
 What reason did Reagan have, though, to believe NASA about its claims for a 
space station when its claims concerning the space shuttle had all but proven untrue?  
Unlike the space shuttle decision, there was no inertial reason for beginning a space 
station project; humans were continuing to fly into space in the space shuttle and the Cold 
War seemed to be coming to an end.  Reagan had initially pledged to cut the budget as 
well- giving approval to a project with a large price tag certainly did not fit in well with 
that pledge.19  Unlike the space shuttle decision, getting Reagan to approve the space 
station is clearly an example of NASA’s ability to persuade.  With no reason to believe 
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NASA’s estimates and project prospects aside from its word, NASA pushed (with 
support from the aerospace industry as well) to get the space station project started.  Not 
only would it continue to give its skilled workforce a highly technical project to work on, 
it would also continue generating contracts for big aerospace companies, and give the 
space shuttle something to do besides releasing satellites and conducting science 
experiments. 
Post-Challenger 
 The loss of the shuttle Challenger was certainly a blow to NASA’s prestige if not 
its power.  The question, rather, focuses on the aftermath and increased funding for 
NASA so that it could construct a replacement orbiter.  According to Wildavsky’s fair 
share thesis, the amount of funding for an agency or department should have nothing to 
do with its performance good or bad, rather its associated with an expectation gathered 
over years of how much the agency should get.20  Contrary to this hypothesis, though. 
NASA experienced an increase in their budget beginning in 1988 for a replacement 
orbiter.   
 But why build a replacement?  Clearly, the shuttle had not lived up to the hype 
and expectations that NASA had set for it in the 1970s.  The Department of Defense did 
not purchase the expected two orbiters and Challenger had shown the continued need for 
expendable launch vehicle options.  But like the justification for the space station, the 
need for another orbiter quickly turns into a rather circular argument.  The space station 
was needed to give the shuttle something to do and now another orbiter was needed to 
complete the space station that was already proving difficult to design and costly.   
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 Determining what portion of the leverage used to wrangle funding for another 
orbiter was from the aerospace industry that wanted continued contracts worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars and what was from NASA proves rather difficult.  NASA’s 
standing was indeed diminished not only by Challenger and the dim prospects for the 
shuttle’s operations but also by its not being fully forthcoming in the immediate 
aftermath of Challenger.  What can be known for sure, however, is that it was no less 
than an exercise of power that increased NASA’s funding for the purposes of 
constructing the orbiter Endeavour.   
George Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative 
 In the late 1980s, NASA was just beginning to recover from the loss of Columbia, 
send shuttles back into orbit and begin to see plans for a space station partially finalized.  
With the election of George Bush to the presidency, NASA would also see a new 
program which had the possibility of reinvigorating the program:  the Space Exploration 
Initiative (SEI).  Announced by the first President Bush on July 20, 1989 on the steps of 
the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, the plan called for building of the new space 
station, a return to the moon, and eventually voyages to Mars.21  A quick 90-day study of 
the plan by NASA into the resources it would require showed the program to be a 
commitment of at least $500 billion; much more than the Congress, the President, or the 
country would allow to be spent.22  
 While the initiation of a new program would be expected to infuse NASA with a 
new sense of mission and purpose, the SEI proposal did nothing of the sort.  In fact, Kay 
claims the proposal “seemed to hit the country with a resounding thud.”23  With NASA’s 
history of forming project proposals in an economically favorable light, the price tag of 
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half a trillion dollars seems to be quite out of character.  Yet in light of the Challenger 
disaster which had the potential of ending the space shuttle program altogether, NASA 
was not quite ready to give up on the space shuttles. 
 Some analysts have claimed that NASA priced the SEI at such a high level on 
purpose claiming that, “Having just won a reprieve in a bread-and-butter program [the 
space shuttle], NASA may well have viewed SEI as a threat to business as usual, just as 
normalcy was being reestablished.”24  By setting the price so high, NASA knew that the 
program would never be supported and it would not have to end the space shuttle 
program any time soon; because of the 90-day study, the Congress and other supports 
became quite “hostile” to SEI and the program eventually died out.25
 If the explanation that NASA intentionally killed SEI is accepted, then it is 
possible to see NASA’s use of power.  In this case, the agency used its power of 
information to create a plan with a price tag so astronomical that it knew the plan would 
never be implemented.  Thus NASA’s power can be interpreted as having increased over 
the time period between Challenger and the end of the decade allowing it to end a 
presidential initiative that would have given it an influx of new money but would have 
put a stop to NASA’s signature program, the space shuttle. 
The Late 1990s 
 With no outright event to demonstrate NASA’s usage of power in the second half 
of the 1990s, the inference of power is completely subjective.  There was no big new 
program yet there were no big new disasters either.  With popular culture bringing space 
back to the forefront and the popular Mars rover beaming back spectacular images, 
NASA saw its presence in the public sphere rise through the late 1990s.  As reported by 
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Launius, beginning in the mid-1990s, the public’s ratings of the job being done by NASA 
rose, from approximately 36% of the public approving of NASA’s performance in 1990 
to a high of approximately 55% in 1996.26
 Whether public opinion directly influences and changes political support for a 
program is a question discussed previously, but suffice it to say here that the connection 
is not clear at all.  In fact, during this time period, NASA’s budget rose slightly and then 
leveled off, if not declined.  Certainly, the fact that no major disaster detracted from 
NASA’s performance influenced some perception of the agency that it was doing better 
in the public.  But does this feeling translate to the political environment in which NASA 
has to operate?  The evidence is less clear.  With no huge spike in NASA’s budget, which 
if you take Greenberg’s assertion that the politics of science is played out in money, one 
could assume that business as usual and program inertia took over through this time 
period.  A sense of complacency took over, with the agency and the rest of the 
government content with the progress and pace.  The International Space Station was 
looking to be up in orbit shortly and the number of space shuttle missions plateaued at 
seven or eight missions a year. 
 But years of reliable performance can also serve to increase an agency or 
department’s reputation as a reliable provider of services.  Nevertheless, with no outright 
action to pinpoint and identify as an example of NASA’s usage of its power, it is difficult 
to say that it even built up power through the rather reliable ‘90s.   
Post-Columbia 
 Unlike the aftermath of Challenger, NASA proactively communicated with the 
press and the public as to the status of the investigation.  The accident, which some have 
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argued could have been prevented, did result, though, in a different, yet similar operating 
atmosphere for NASA.  In 1986 and 1987, NASA argued for, and got, increased funding 
for the purposes of building a replacement orbiter.  In 2003 and 2004, NASA got not just 
a new orbiter but a brand new human spaceflight program.  The question thus becomes 
that in the face of tragedy and failure, what is the impetus to give a supposedly declining 
organization more money and a new program to undertake? 
 Since this idea has already been explored in chapter two, the focus should be on 
NASA’s usage of power in the aftermath of Columbia.  Like Challenger, the agency was 
badly damaged and highly criticized for its culture, performance, and actions leading up 
to the accident.  But for all its pitfalls, NASA was able to push for a new program.  While 
the accident brought home the fact to NASA that they needed to come up with a 
replacement for the shuttle, election year politics also come into play in the decision to 
approve Constellation.  Up for reelection in 2004 with two wars, President George W. 
Bush, announced his Vision for Space Exploration in January 2004, only ten months 
prior to the November election.  Yet some have questioned and even doubted Bush’s 
confidence in the program.  As governor of Texas, he never visited the Johnson Space 
Center, home of the manned program and mission control.  Further, since announcing the 
program, he has not made many efforts to support it and increase funding.  In fact, most 
of the funds for Constellation come from the savings that will be acquired in retiring the 
space shuttle.   
 Columbia vividly drove home the point that the shuttle needed to be replaced.  
Seeing an opportunity to push a multi-billion dollar program that would provide jobs in 
major election states like Texas, Florida, and Alabama, whether NASA’s power actually 
 109
influenced Bush’s decision or the power of politics did is the question.  With NASA’s 
power clearly diminished by Columbia, one has to suspect that it was election year ploys 
more than NASA power that played a role in the decision.   
Tracing Power Over Time 
 So how does any of this relate to being able to trace NASA’s power over time to 
provide a useful comparison to the other indicators?  From this analysis, it is apparent 
that in the least, NASA’s power has risen and fallen over time.  In figure 4-1, I have 
plotted my summary of NASA’s power using a scale of one to ten with one being the 
least power and ten being the most power.  Taking from the analysis presented in this 
chapter and chapter three, I believe it can safely be surmised that even if the numbers are 
different, that the pattern of NASA’s power is similar to what appears in figure 4-2. 
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Figure 0-2:  NASA’s Power Over Time 
 
  The usefulness of the data being presented in this manner is that this line 
chart can be placed onto line charts depicting NASA’s budget and performance over the 
years, as has been done in figure 4-3.  In order to gauge performance, in this chart, I used 
the number of GAO reports but inverted it.  In other words, if NASA had five reports 
written about it in one year and ten in the next that would mean that their performance 
had worsened.  If those numbers were placed on the chart as they are, however, it would 
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appear as if their performance had actually improved.  By inverting the numbers so that 
they appear as -5 and -10, a line graph would show the decrease in performance. 
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Figure 0-3:  NASA Budget, Performance, and Power 
 
 
 To continue the analysis from this chart, it would be best to break it into different 
time periods from which to analyze the relationship between budgets, performance, and 
power.  From 1970 to about 1985, while performance buoyed up and down, it remained 
relatively stable along with the budget and power.  In fact, through 1985, NASA’s power 
remained relatively unchanged and the budget increased.  The various numbers of GAO 
reports which reflect NASA’s performance at the time are attributable to reports on the 
 112
status of the space transportation system, or the space shuttle.  Between 1986 and 1990, 
however, two contradictory things are apparent.  One, according to the GAD model, we 
would expect the budget to decrease before decrease performance.  The budget, though, 
continued to rise peaking in 1987 with the funding to build the Challenger replacement.  
Second, performance decreases only after power does and again, according to our model, 
we should see power decrease only after performance does. 
 Yet there is a very good methodological reason to explain these contradictory 
conclusions.  While it is assumed that performance affects power and not the other way 
around, the measures of power and performance do not accurately reflect the reality of 
the situation.  The subjective measure of power immediately reflects circumstances of 
any given year (for example, 1986), but the measure being used for performance, that is, 
the number of GAO reports, has an inherent time lag in it.  It takes time to write reports; 
the immediacy of performance is not accurately shown, then, by this measure.  While 
other indicators of performance could be used in the above graph, none of the other 
performance variables used in this analysis have shown significance.  We become stuck 
between a rock and a hard place, then, with respect to the contradictory conclusions. 
 Nevertheless, figure 4-3 still allows us to draw some significant conclusions, 
particularly in the 1990s.  As NASA’s power steadily rose, so did their budget.  The 
agency performance also improved during the ‘90s, going from a high of 38 reports in 
1992 to a low of seven in 1998, a level which had not been seen for almost a decade.  
Without better real-time indicators of performance, however, it would not be appropriate 
to draw more significant conclusions beyond speculating about the pattern of data. 
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Hypothesis Four:  Power and Budgets 
 Without quantitative measures of power, it is difficult to quantitatively analyze 
the connection between power and budgets.  As such, I will instead examine the 
relationship between NASA budget and the rough measurement of power provided in the 
above charts.  Because of the tentative nature of the power measurement, however, we 
must regard any results as potentially spurious. 
 In a correlation analysis presented in table A-19, a negative relationship is found 
between NASA’s power and its budget with the relationship becoming strongest and 
most significant when a five year time lag is included (at five years, Pearson=-0.571, 
sig.=0.001).  While the method of measuring power can not be seen as very reliable, the 
results suggest that power does not have a strong positive influence on budgets.   
 Completing the cycle, we can include the rough estimation of power in a linear 
regression with GDP to examine the effect these two variables combined have on 
budgets; table A-20 presents these results.  Compared to the effect that only GDP has on 
predicting NASA’s budget, our predictive power increases by as much as 10%.  
Including a time effect of three years, power and GDP work together to help explain up 
to 96% of NASA’s budget compared to 86.1% using just GDP.  Thus while power alone 
does not have a strong effect on NASA’s budget, power in conjunction with GDP, as 
predicted by the model, does. 
Conclusion 
 While leaving a complete discussion of results to the next chapter, the major 
finding in this analysis is that something more than simply economic performance is 
involved in determining the yearly NASA budget.  Further, there does seem to be some 
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sort of relationship between the NASA budget and the human spaceflight program with 
no major correlations being found within the scientific program.   
 Measures of power leave something to be desired, as quantitative indicators of 
how much power one holds, has, or uses are elusive if not impossible to develop.  Yet, 
we can clearly see that NASA’s power has risen and fallen between 1970-2005 and can 
be somewhat projected onto a line graph to match with indicators of the other categories. 
 Finally, we do see some interaction of power and GDP in the influence of 
NASA’s budget, particularly after some period of time has elapsed.  We will examine the 
significance of this finding in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5:  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Nearly forty years after the US first went to the moon, what has happened to the 
agency that put them there?  From declarations of an agency in decline to accidents that 
might prove the claim to more funding and new programs, what is to explain the rise and 
fall of NASA’s outputs through the years?  In chapter one, the claim that a new 
conception of decline in government was needed was put forward and in the previous 
chapters I hope to have proven that.  Here, I will discuss the meaning of the data in 
chapter four and its effects on the government agency decline model.  I will then examine 
prospects for further research and conclude the discussion. 
Discussion of Results 
 In chapter four, statistical tests and their results were presented to test the 
government agency decline model.  The first conclusion that can be reached from that 
data is that overall national economic performance does greatly influence budget levels.  
Interestingly enough, and pursuant to the GAD model, the effect that GDP has on 
NASA’s budget is less than the effect that it has on the US budget, the discretionary 
budget or the budgets of the NSF and NIH.  As a result, there seems to be something else 
influencing NASA’s budget.  This conclusion is contrary to Wildavsky’s idea of “fair 
share” in that there is not simply a consensus approach to agency budgeting at the federal 
level, but other considerations, predominantly economic, are important.  To be fair to 
Wildavsky, however, no large scale study examining legislators’ attitudes towards agency 
budgeting.  It is quite possible that this idea of fair share is connected to the economy 
such that legislators’ attitudes could be included as an intervening variable. 
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 The next hypothesis that was tested was that an agency’s budget affects its 
performance.  A slight negative correlation was found between NASA’s budget and the 
total number of launches per year, suggesting that some time is needed for the budget 
changes to affect the number of launches. Reflecting the proportion of the entire NASA 
budget that manned spaceflight encompasses, there were stronger relationships among 
budget and performance factors measuring performance of the human spaceflight 
program.  
 What is also apparent within this concept is the delineation of very public 
performance indicators and public indicators relegated to the governmental sphere only.  
Launches of satellites and shuttles are quite visible to the general public while indicators 
of performance such as the number and nature of GAO reports, while public, is not 
widely paid attention to outside of the government.  Which of the performance indicators 
to use, public or semi-public, is a problem that largely depends on the next aspect of the 
GAD model, specifically whether power is public or governmental in nature.  
 The next aspect of the model to be tested was that performance affects power.  
The qualitative analysis clearly shows that NASA’s power has been flexible, certain 
points in time can be identified where NASA has clearly used its power demonstrating 
that it has it.  Using a rudimentary measure of power based on this analysis, a negative 
correlation was found between power and NASA’s budget suggesting that as power went 
up, the agency’s budget fell.  While acknowledging that a better measure of power is 
needed since the results could be spurious, the result is contrary to what was expected. 
 Finally, the last hypothesis examined was that an agency’s power affects their 
budget and that overall economic performance is also a factor in that determination.  
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Even though power seemed to have a negative influence on NASA’s budget, a regression 
analysis with power and GDP as independent variables and NASA budget as the 
dependent demonstrated that the relationship is quite significant and highly explanatory.  
In the same year and including time effects of one to five years, power and GDP working 
together help to explain NASA’s budget more than GDP alone with the relationship 
becoming stronger and more significant in years three and four.     
 Thus far, the analysis has garnered mixed results for the GAD model but another 
important aspect is that there should be a time lag between all of these indicators; that 
there should be some period of time between when economic performance affects budget, 
another period of time between a budget’s effect on performance, and so on.  These time 
lag effects were also tested for.  GDP had the strongest effect on budget in the same year 
for almost all of the cases examined.  The only exception to that were the cases of the 
NSF and NIH, signaling that their budgets increased no matter the GDP.  This also 
confirms their choices as appropriate baselines from which to examine the budget of 
NASA.  That other scientific agencies experienced constant and consistent increases in 
their budget and NASA did not effectively means that something else was affecting the 
budget of NASA.   
 Similar to the finding that the strongest relationship between budget and 
performance was to be found among performance indicators relating to human 
spaceflight, time lag effects were also found between NASA budget and human 
spaceflight performance.  While the relationships are significant, the strength of them 
does decrease over time again showing that the strongest relationship occurs in the same 
year.  When examining the science portion of NASA’s budget and science missions, a 
 120
relationship was found with a one-year time lag.  On the verge of significance 
(significance= .050), this signals that among science missions we should expect some 
sort of time lag as it takes years of planning and development for science missions to 
actually occur. 
 Although power on its own was shown to have the opposite effect than what was 
predicted, when the variable is used in regression analyses, it enhances the relationship 
particularly after three years.  While this is the effect that was predicted, that the previous 
hypotheses do not have a significant time effect leads to the question of whether the 
results are spurious either for power and GDP’s effect on budget or for hypotheses one 
and two or time effects only need to be included in the model for the power to budget 
stage.  This is a question that cannot be resolved here; the measure of power being 
utilized might be the problem which of course would have to wait to be resolved until a 
more reliable indicator of power can be discovered.  Logically, however, a time effect 
would most likely be needed between budgets and performance; money does not flow 
directly into projects but must go through mission directorates and be approved for 
specific purposes.  While there is a slight suggestion that the time lag is present, more 
research is needed. 
 This brings the discussion to a question of what it means for the GAD model.  
There is some data reinforcing the model.  Some other piece of data does need to be 
included so as to enhance the relationship between economic performance and NASA’s 
budget.  Human spaceflight performance is indeed helped by the budget reflecting the 
focus on human spaceflight by the agency, the rest of the government, and the public.  
What clearly needs to be reconsidered within the model is the use of a time lag.  
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Particularly within the relationships between economic performance and budgets and 
budgets and performance, the primary effect declines over time.  There still may be some 
use for it, however, when examining the other end of the model and the effect that power 
and GDP jointly have on a budget. 
Limitations of GAD and Ideas for Further Research 
 The application of the GAD model to NASA is all well and good, but what about 
its applications to other agencies?  In the data analysis, the budgets of the National 
Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health all rose over time, regardless of 
the GDP.  This would suggest that no matter their performance or the relative amount of 
power they held, their budget would still rise; thus, GAD may not be applicable to them.  
It seems that what NASA has or lacks (relatively speaking) compared to the NSF and 
NIH is the duty to operate in a highly politicized environment.  As much as one would 
like to, in government, it is quite impossible to forget about the politics of the situation 
and the politics of the environment in which you work.  A strong argument could be 
made that the NSF and NIH make relatively apolitical contributions to people’s lives.  
NASA, on the other hand, was created essentially to carry out a political task and it 
continues to operate as such. 
 Downs’s work on the bureaucracy focuses closely on the initial growth stages of 
an agency; this is noticeably absent from the model.  GAD serves to extend the Downs 
analysis and as such can only be applied to agencies that are beyond these initial stages.  
In this case, I have joined NASA eleven years into its existence.  Arguably, this time 
frame could be difference dependent on which agency the model is being applied to. 
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 The benefit of the GAD model is that it includes as explanatory factors all those 
variables, which operate in political environments:  power, overall economic 
performance, budgets, and performance.  Because of this, the agencies and departments 
that it may apply best to are agencies created out of or for political purposes.  The 
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Department of Homeland Security are past and 
present examples of this.  GAD may not adequately describe agencies that are created to 
fulfill specific apolitical or nominally political purposes such as the Internal Revenue 
Service, the Social Security Administration or the Department of Health and Human 
Services.   
Related to this, I explicitly call GAD a model and not a theory; I do not believe it 
would be appropriate or possible to develop specific indicators of particularly 
performance that could be used across a variety of government agencies.  Depending on 
the agency and the nature of its operations, performance standards need to be created and 
tailored to the specific agency.  A broad outline of a theory could be designed to say that 
economic factors affect a agency’s (political in nature) budget, which in turn affects 
performance and then affects power which then helps to explain that agency’s budget.  
Including all of these explanatory factors is a net positive gain over prior descriptions of 
government decline and agency growth. 
 Clearly, more research is needed before the conclusion that the GAD model 
accurately describes political agencies is reached.  Further research is varied and could 
include applications of the model to other agencies, perhaps the Department of Homeland 
Security or the NIH as a control.  Development of more accurate indicators of power 
would also help to enhance the analysis.   
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Conclusion 
 The government agency decline model is a good first step in examining what 
affects an agency’s outputs and inputs and in turn, its operations.  By including many (if 
not all) of the political factors into a single model, it can eventually help to predict budget 
levels and help performance by knowing the effects that funding has on it.  Clearly, 
further refining is needed, but good progress has been made here in showing the 
explanatory power of the model. 
 What must have gone through the minds of the twelve men who walked on the 
moon as they prepared to say goodbye to it?  Knowing that nothing in their lives would 
probably be like the moment they were experiencing right then, the collective minds of 
NASA were probably wondering the same thing.  Nothing is ever going to be like the 
moon, for the moon walkers or for NASA. What has probably spurned so much 
discussion of whether NASA is or was in a decline or not was the fact that nothing they 
could do besides landing a human on Mars was ever going to be anything like landing 
humans on the moon.   
 Perhaps what is needed for NASA is the realization that while nothing will ever 
be like what has been done before, the opportunity for still greater things lies ahead.  
Though NASA operates within a politically charged environment that affects nearly 
everything that it does or tries to do, understanding the mechanism through which politics 
operates can help them and us understand why it is so difficult to get funding for such big 
ideas.  For other agencies that must operate within similar limitations and the scholars 
who study them, having a model that can explain the fluxes agencies experience is 
helpful.  Decline in government is not really decline unless the agency disappears.  And 
since most agencies can be assured of their continued existence, I do not believe that the 
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idea of decline as applied to individual agencies is useful.  If an agency is declining, most 
times, it is because of nothing that they have done or can control; it has to be related back 
to the environment at large and in this case that environment is national politics. 
 Memories of the moon landing may be fading now, but expectations of what 
NASA can do and will do have the prospect of rising; a declining agency would not be 
able to claim that.  The challenge is in convincing the public and the rest of the 
government (through the mechanism of acquiring power) that greater things can and will 
be done and are happening now.  Tom Hanks as astronaut Jim Lovell in the movie 
“Apollo 13” says, “Imagine if Christopher Columbus came back from the New World 
and no one returned in his footsteps.”  Even though the moon landings of the 1960s and 
1970s are over, there is always continued exploration, no matter the form, to look 
forward to. 
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Table 0-1:  Correlations of GDP to Budget Variables 
  GDP 
Total US Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.994 
.000 
NASA Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.937 
.000 
NASA Manned Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.941 
.000 
NASA Science Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.805 
.000 
Discretionary Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.971 
.000 
NSF Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.985 
.000 
NIH Budget Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.962 
.000 
 
Table 0-2:  Correlations of GDP to Budget Variables with Time Effects 
  One 
Year 
Two 
Years 
Three 
Years 
Four 
Years 
Five 
Years 
NASA 
Budget 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.936 
.000 
.933 
.000 
.928 
.000 
.921 
.000 
.916 
.000 
Total US 
Budget 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.994 
.000 
.993 
.000 
.993 
.000 
.993 
.000 
.993 
.000 
Discretionary 
Budget 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.969 
.000 
.966 
.000 
.965 
.000 
.964 
.000 
.962 
.000 
NSF Budget Pearson 
Sig. 
.985 
.000 
.985 
.000 
.987 
.000 
.989 
.000 
.990 
.000 
NIH Budget Pearson 
Sig. 
.961 
.000 
.963 
.000 
.965 
.000 
.967 
.000 
.966 
.000 
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Table 0-3:  Regression Analysis of GDP to Budget 
Dependent 
Variable 
B Constant 
B GDP 
Significance R-Square 
Total US 
Budget 
65.812 
.192 
.006 
.000 
.989 
NASA Budget 2.412 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.877 
Human NASA 
Budget 
2.120 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.886 
Science NASA 
Budget 
.292 
.0000914 
.000 
.000 
.648 
Discretionary 87.961 
.064 
.000 
.000 
.944 
NSF -.174 
.000 
.030 
.000 
.971 
NIH -.003 
.00000229 
.000 
.000 
.925 
 
Table 0-4:  Regression Analysis of GDP to Total US Budget with Time Effects 
Time Lag of 
Budget 
B Constant 
B GDP 
Significance R- Square 
One Year 92.927 
.199 
.000 
.000 
.987 
Two Years 125.538 
.206 
.000 
.000 
.986 
Three Years 163.620 
.211 
.000 
.000 
.985 
Four Years 204.864 
.217 
.000 
.000 
.986 
Five Years 247.377 
.222 
.000 
.000 
.986 
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Table 0-5:  Regression Analysis of GDP to NASA Budget with Time Effects 
Time Lag of 
Budget 
B Constant 
B GDP 
Significance R- Square 
One Year 2.537 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.876 
Two Years 2.757 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.870 
Three Years 3.046 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.861 
Four Years 3.368 
.001 
.000 
.000 
.849 
Five Years 3.744 
.002 
.000 
.000 
.840 
 
Table 0-6:  Regression Analysis of GDP to NSF Budget with Time Effects 
Time Lag of 
Budget 
B Constant 
B GDP 
Significance R- Square 
One Year -.150 
.000 
.072 
.000 
.969 
Two Years -.123 
.000 
-.136 
.000 
.971 
Three Years -.091 
.000 
.240 
.000 
.975 
Four Years -.054 
.000 
.454 
.000 
.978 
Five Years -.022 
.001 
.759 
.000 
.980 
 
 
Table 0-7:  Regression Analysis of GDP to NIH Budget with Time Effects 
Time Lag of 
Budget 
B Constant 
B GDP 
Significance R- Square 
One Year -.003 
2.40 E-006 
.000 
.000 
.924 
Two Years -.003 
2.53 E-006 
.000 
.000 
.927 
Three Years -.003 
2.65 E-006 
.000 
.000 
.932 
Four Years -.003 
2.78 E-006 
.000 
.000 
.934 
Five Years -.003 
2.92 E-006 
.001 
.000 
.934 
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Table 0-8:  Correlations of NASA Budget to Performance Panel 
  NASA Budget 
Total Launches Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
-.343 
.040 
Number of Successful 
Launches 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
-.280 
.098 
Success Rate in Total 
Launches 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.313 
.063 
Number of Science 
Missions 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.275 
.166 
Number of Human Flights Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.625 
.000 
Percent of On Time 
Human Flights 
Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.453 
.006 
Number of GAO Reports Pearson Correlation 
Significance 
.602 
.000 
*Significant results in bold 
 
Table 0-9: Correlations of Budget to Performance Panel with Time Effects 
  One Year Two 
Years 
Three 
Years 
Four 
Years 
Five 
Years 
Total 
Launches 
Pearson 
Sig. 
-.207 
.240 
-.134 
.456 
-.140 
.446 
-.119 
.525 
-.091 
.631 
Success 
Rate 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.323 
.063 
.316 
.074 
.307 
.087 
.308 
.092 
.289 
.122 
Science 
Missions 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.271 
.180 
.246 
.236 
.248 
.242 
.276 
.202 
.308 
.164 
Human 
Missions 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.591 
.000 
.550 
.001 
.490 
.004 
.434 
.015 
.340 
.066 
On Time 
Flights 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.374 
.029 
.344 
.050 
.315 
.080 
.299 
.103 
.219 
.245 
GAO 
Reports 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.524 
.001 
.480 
.005 
.406 
.021 
.412 
.021 
.298 
.109 
*Significant results in bold 
 
Table 0-10:  Correlations of Manned Budget to Human Spaceflight Performance 
with Time Effects 
  Same 
Year 
One 
Year 
Two 
Years 
Three 
Years 
Four 
Years 
Five 
Years 
Human 
Flights 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.616 
.000 
.582 
.000 
.541 
.001 
.486 
.005 
.435 
.014 
.342 
.064 
Percent 
On 
Time 
Pearson  
Sig. 
.449 
.006 
.374 
.029 
.341 
.052 
.310 
.084 
.293 
.110 
.215 
.253 
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*Significant results in bold 
  
Table 0-11:  Correlations of Science Budget to Science Mission Performance with 
Time Effects 
  Same 
Year 
One 
Year 
Two 
Years 
Three 
Years 
Four 
Years 
Five 
Years 
Total 
Flights 
Pearson 
Sig. 
-.320 
.057 
-.149 
.400 
-.042 
.818 
-.080 
.663 
-.075 
.689 
-.127 
.503 
Success 
Rate 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.213 
.212 
.297 
.088 
.334 
.057 
.325 
.070 
.279 
.128 
.238 
.205 
Science 
Missions 
Pearson 
Sig. 
.240 
.229 
.389 
.050 
.339 
.097 
.342 
.102 
.302 
.161 
.332 
.131 
*Significant results in bold 
 
Table 0-12:  Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Total Launches with Time 
Effects 
Time B Constant 
B NASA Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year 35.951 
-.756 
.000 
.040 
.118 
One Year 31.489 
-.422 
.000 
.240 
.043 
Two Year 29.589 
-.270 
.000 
.456 
.018 
Three Year 29.676 
-.288 
.000 
.446 
.020 
Four Year 29.211 
-.251 
.000 
.525 
.014 
Five Year 28.318 
-.193 
.000 
.631 
.008 
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Table 0-13:  Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Total Human Flights with 
Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B NASA Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year -.635 
.401 
.489 
.000 
.390 
One Year -.183 
.388 
.849 
.000 
.349 
Two Year .201 
.365 
.841 
.001 
.302 
Three Year .704 
.327 
.504 
.004 
.240 
Four Year 1.193 
.290 
.276 
.015 
.189 
Five Year 1.904 
.226 
.100 
.066 
.115 
 
Table 0-14:  Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Percent On Time Human 
Flights with Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B NASA Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year -2.372 
3.741 
.860 
.006 
.205 
One Year 5.918 
3.197 
.682 
.029 
.140 
Two Year 9.377 
2.996 
.527 
.050 
.119 
Three Year 12.977 
2.777 
.394 
.080 
.099 
Four Year 15.638 
2.664 
.313 
.103 
.089 
Five Year 23.236 
1.965 
.149 
.245 
.048 
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Table 0-15:  Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Number of GAO Reports with 
Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B NASA Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year .011 
.872 
.996 
.000 
.363 
One Year 1.466 
.785 
.528 
.001 
.275 
Two Year 2.368 
.726 
.238 
.005 
.230 
Three Year 3.577 
.624 
.165 
.021 
.165 
Four Year 3.734 
.641 
.152 
.021 
.170 
Five Year 5.608 
.464 
.043 
.109 
.089 
 
Table 0-16:  Regression Analysis of Human Spaceflight Budget to Number of 
Human Flights with Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B Human 
Spaceflight Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year    
One Year -.107 
.415 
.912 
.000 
.339 
Two Year .269 
.390 
.789 
.001 
.293 
Three Year .738 
.354 
.484 
.005 
.236 
Four Year 1.192 
.318 
.276 
.014 
.189 
Five Year 1.892 
.249 
.101 
.064 
.117 
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Table 0-17:  Regression Analysis of Human Spaceflight Budget to Percent of On 
Time Human Flights with Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B Human 
Spaceflight Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year    
One Year 6.081 
3.472 
.672 
.029 
.140 
Two Year 9.794 
3.225 
.508 
.052 
.116 
Three Year 13.372 
2.990 
.379 
.084 
.096 
Four Year 16.105 
2.860 
.299 
.110 
.086 
Five Year 23.501 
2.120 
.145 
.253 
.046 
 
Table 0-18:  Regression Analysis of Science Budget to Number of Science Missions 
with Time Effects 
Time B Constant 
B Science Budget 
Significance R-Square 
Same Year 2.458 
.956 
.002 
.229 
.057 
One Year 2.033 
1.518 
.007 
.050 
.151 
Two Year 2.239 
1.333 
.005 
.097 
.115 
Three Year 2.206 
1.379 
.008 
.102 
.117 
Four Year 2.376 
1.237 
.008 
.161 
.091 
Five Year 2.278 
1.383 
.012 
.131 
.110 
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Table 0-19: Correlations Between NASA Power and NASA Budget 
Length of Time Effect Pearson Correlation Significance 
None- Same Year -0.464 0.004 
One Year -0.499 0.002 
Two Years -0.466 0.005 
Three Years -0.456 0.008 
Four Years -0.515 0.003 
Five Years -0.571 0.001 
 
 
 
Table 0-20:  Regression Analysis:  GDP and Power’s Effect on NASA Budget 
Length of Time 
Effect 
B Constant 
B Power 
B GDP 
Significance R-Square 
None- Same Year 5.178 
-0.386 
0.001 
0.000 
0.010 
0.000 
0.900 
One Year 6.116 
-0.498 
0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.915 
Two Years 6.767 
-0.569 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.922 
Three Years 8.502 
-0.802 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.960 
Four Years 8.883 
-0.790 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.946 
Five Years 9.128 
-0.748 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.927 
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APPENDIX B:  ANALYSIS OF GAO REPORTS 
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1970  2         2 
1971     2 1     3 
1972    1       1 
1973    1 1 1     3 
1974    1  1 1    3 
1975  1         1 
1976  5  1   2    8 
1977  1  2  3 4    10 
1978  1  2 1 2     6 
1979  1   1 1     3 
1980  1   1 1 1    4 
1981    3  1 1    5 
1982  1  2  2     5 
1983    1 1      2 
1984  2    2     4 
1985      1     1 
1986    2       2 
1987   1 1 1 2 1  2  8 
1988  1  5  5 1 1 1  14 
1989    1  1 3  1  6 
1990  2  1 1 2 1 1 4 1 13 
1991  2 2 2 1 1 3 1 2  14 
1992 1 2 7 3 6 6 10 3   38 
1993  3 2 4 3  4 2 1  19 
1994   3 2 5  1   1 12 
1995  3 1 2  1 4   2 13 
1996  3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2  12 
1997  3 4 1 2 1 1   1 13 
1998  1 2  2  1   1 7 
1999  2 5  2   2 1  12 
2000  1 3 2     1  7 
2001  4 3 1  1  2   11 
2002 1 3 1 2 1 1     9 
2003  2 1 1  5     9 
2004 2   1  1 3    7 
2005 1 1  3 1 4 1    11 
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APPENDIX C:  VARIABLES AND SOURCES 
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Indicator/Variable Format Source 
Budget   
GDP  OMB Historical Data Tables 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf 
 
US Budget Billions of 
Dollars 
OMB Historical Data Tables 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf 
Discretionary 
Budget 
Billions of 
Dollars 
OMB Historical Data Tables 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf 
NASA Budget Billions of 
Dollars 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
Human Spaceflight 
Budget 
Billions of 
Dollars 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
Science Budget Billions of 
Dollars 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
NSF Budget Billions of 
Dollars 
OMB Historical Data Tables 
NIH Budget Billions of 
Dollars 
The NIH Almanac 
http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/index.html 
Performance   
Total Launches Number of 
Launches per 
Year 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
Science Missions Number of 
Science 
Missions 
Launched per 
Year 
http://science.hq.nasa.gov/ 
Number of 
Successful 
Launches 
Number of 
Successful 
Launches per 
Year 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
Number of Failed 
Launches 
Number of 
Failed 
Launches per 
Year 
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2005 
Success Rate Success Rate 
of Launches 
per Year 
Calculated from data in the Aeronautics and Space 
Report of the President, Fiscal Year 2005  
Failure Rate Failure Rate of 
Launches per 
Year 
Calculated from data in the Aeronautics and Space 
Report of the President, Fiscal Year 2005 
Number of Human Number of NASA Shuttle Mission Archives 
 139
Flights Human Flights 
per Year 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemis
sions/list_main.html 
Total Delay Days Total Days per 
Year Human 
Flights 
Delayed 
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives 
Number of Flights 
Delayed 
Number of 
Human Flights 
per Year 
Delayed 
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives 
Average Delay in 
Days 
Average Delay 
of Human 
Flights per 
Year 
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives 
Percent of Flights 
Delayed 
Percent of 
Human Flights 
Experiencing a 
Delay per 
Year 
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives 
Percent of Flights 
Launched On Time 
Percent of 
Human Flights 
Launched On 
Time per Year 
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives 
Number of GAO 
Reports 
Number of 
GAO Reports 
Written 
Concerning 
NASA per 
Year 
Calculated from a Search of GAO Reports Published 
Between 1970 and 2005 
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